Summary

  • The Trump-Vance administration and the Iranian government have presented sharply contradictory accounts of a memorandum of understanding neither side has released, and those contradictions expose a stakeholder landscape in which multiple parties with direct interests in the outcome were either absent from the negotiations or positioned to act independently of the agreement’s terms.
  • Vice President JD Vance characterized the deal as securing toll-free reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and a long-term Iranian commitment not to develop nuclear weapons, while Iranian state media asserted Iran retains control of the strait, secured an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, and can unlock at least $12 billion in frozen assets upfront.
  • Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated Monday that Israel would not withdraw forces from Lebanese territory, directly contradicting the Iranian account and positioning Israel as a non-signatory stakeholder whose actions could determine whether the agreement holds.
  • The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps controls the Strait of Hormuz physically and holds institutional incentives to monetize that control, creating a structural gap between any text-based commitment and operational implementation.
  • Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and major oil-importing nations such as China and India were absent from the reported negotiations despite holding direct interests in the strait’s status and Iran’s economic recovery.

The memorandum of understanding announced late Sunday between the United States and Iran to end the war that began in April has produced two sharply divergent public narratives with no text released. Senior U.S. officials said the full text would be published within 24 to 48 hours. Until then, the agreement exists largely as competing claims, and those claims reveal a stakeholder landscape considerably more complex than the bilateral framing suggests — a landscape in which several parties with direct interests in the outcome were either absent from the negotiations or positioned to act independently of whatever was agreed.

The Two Accounts

The gap between announcement and publication allows each government to present a version of events to its own political base, regional allies, and international markets without yet committing to a single enforceable document. The accounts diverge on every major dimension of the agreement.

U.S. account. Vance, in Monday appearances on CNBC and ABC, characterized the deal as securing a long-term Iranian commitment not to develop a nuclear weapon and the toll-free reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran’s Revolutionary Guard closed to international shipping at the start of hostilities. “Those are two very big wins for the American people,” Vance told CNBC. Asked about reports that the agreement required an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, Vance said Iranian state media were misrepresenting the agreement for domestic consumption. President Trump told The Wall Street Journal that “Iran would not be provided cash in the deal.” Vance told ABC that “Iran doesn’t get a dime of money unless they perform their obligations” and that the funds involved were “fundamentally sanctions relief,” with significant relief to follow only after Iranian commitments to abandon its nuclear weapons program and stop funding militant groups. Senior U.S. officials denied that Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon was a condition of the agreement. The American account thus describes a performance-based mechanism in which Tehran receives gradual access to frozen assets only after verifiable steps.

Iranian account. Iranian state media presented a different arrangement. Those accounts asserted that President Trump agreed Israel would leave southern Lebanon and end its war against Hezbollah, that Iran would retain control of the Strait of Hormuz, and that the deal could unlock at least $12 billion of frozen funds upfront, part of an estimated $100 billion of Iranian assets held abroad. Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said Monday that Iran intended to charge for navigation services, environmental protection, and ship insurance in the strait — directly contradicting Vance’s expectation of toll-free reopening. Iranian outlets reported that Tehran secured the Lebanon concession by threatening to strike Israel in retaliation for attacks on Beirut on Sunday. Baghaei said Iran would be able to sell oil without obstacles upon signature of the memorandum and that the U.S. would be obliged to lift all sanctions, though the mechanism remained to be discussed.

The intermediary characterization. The Wall Street Journal’s originating report cited unnamed Middle East officials involved in the talks as describing an arrangement in which Tehran would receive gradual access to frozen assets in exchange for certain goods, likened to Iraq’s oil-for-food program. That characterization came from intermediary sources rather than from either principal — a distinction that will matter when the full text is published and the mechanism can be assessed directly. The U.S. has cautioned that details published in Iranian state media are inaccurate and designed for domestic consumption.

Stakeholder Landscape

The divergent accounts are not incidental; they reflect a negotiating structure in which multiple parties hold distinct interests. Mapping those stakeholders through the stakeholder salience model — the framework of power, legitimacy, and urgency developed by Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997) — clarifies the forces that will shape whether the agreement holds.

Trump-Vance Administration. Under the salience model, the U.S. administration holds definitive salience: direct negotiating power, legitimacy as the party controlling sanctions and military leverage, and urgency driven by the conflict’s domestic political costs. The administration faces the political cost of appearing to negotiate with a regime whose nuclear program the U.S. bombed the previous year; the Vance narrative positions the agreement as an unconditional American victory. The delayed publication of the text creates a strategic vulnerability: every hour the Iranian account circulates unchallenged by documentation is an hour in which the competing narrative shapes global perception.

Iranian Government. Tehran holds comparable power and urgency. The country faces soaring inflation and the collapse of its export-driven economy; the estimated $100 billion in frozen assets abroad represents a domestic political necessity, not merely a negotiating preference. Iranian negotiators have institutional incentives to frame the deal as having extracted maximal concessions — Lebanon, Hormuz control, sanctions relief — because the domestic political cost of appearing to capitulate would be severe. If the final published text fails to deliver on these points, the government risks appearing to have traded military disruption for empty promises. Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s foreign minister, said the country would sign on Friday, likely in Switzerland. The gap between Baghaei’s characterization and Vance’s likely reflects fundamentally different understandings of what the memorandum obliges each side to do.

Israel. Katz said Monday that Israel would not withdraw its forces from Lebanese territory — a statement that directly contradicts the Iranian account of the deal and positions Israel as a stakeholder whose actions could determine whether the agreement holds or collapses. Israel holds high power as a militarily active party and high urgency given Hezbollah’s presence in occupied territory. The salience model classifies Israel as dominant: it has the power to act independently and the legitimacy of a sovereign defense posture, but it was not a signatory to the memorandum. If the Iranian account of a Lebanon withdrawal requirement is accurate, the absence of Israeli consent renders that term unenforceable. If the U.S. account is accurate and no such requirement exists, the Iranian domestic narrative will be tested against observable Israeli behavior.

Hezbollah. An actor with no reported seat at the table but with direct capacity to affect the agreement’s durability. Hezbollah’s presence in southern Lebanon is the condition that Israeli forces are there to address. If the deal does not formally constrain Hezbollah — and neither account suggests it does — then the group retains the ability to initiate hostilities that could pull both Israel and Iran back into escalation. Under the salience model, Hezbollah holds urgency and may hold a claim to legitimacy as a Lebanese political actor, but it lacks formal power over the memorandum — classified as demanding: affected and assertive yet lacking the formal power to shape the agreement directly. Its relevance is indirect but potentially decisive.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The IRGC controls the Strait of Hormuz — the physical chokepoint over which the two accounts directly conflict. Vance said the expectation was that the strait would be opened in a toll-free way for the long term; Baghaei said Iran would charge for navigation services, environmental protection, and ship insurance. Both statements cannot be simultaneously accurate. The IRGC’s institutional interest in maintaining control of the strait — a leverage asset it did not possess before the war — suggests that the practical implementation of any reopening will depend on whether the IRGC treats the memorandum as binding or as aspirational. Under the salience model, the IRGC holds power — operational control of the strait — and urgency — institutional interest in retaining a new strategic asset — but limited legitimacy in the international system. That combination the model classifies as dangerous: able to impose its will on the strait’s status without the social license that would constrain it.

International Shipping and Energy Markets. The Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant share of global oil shipments transit, has been closed since the conflict’s outset. The difference between a toll-free reopening and a fee-based regime is a structural shift in the cost of global energy transport. The shipping industry and consuming nations hold high interest and high legitimacy but limited direct power over the negotiating terms — dependent stakeholders whose welfare is determined by others’ decisions. Their urgency is acute: every day of continued closure imposes measurable economic costs.

Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Gulf Hydrocarbon Exporters. The originating report does not reference Gulf state positions, but the deal’s terms — whether Iran receives sanctions relief, whether it retains the strait as a lever, whether Israel withdraws from Lebanon — directly affect the regional balance of power. An Iran with access to $12 billion or more in frozen assets and retained control of a maritime chokepoint is a materially different strategic actor. Under the salience model, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf partners are classified as dominant stakeholders — high power, high legitimacy — with significant urgency. Their absence from the reported negotiations does not diminish their stake; it increases the probability that their interests will be asserted outside the agreement’s framework.

Major Oil-Importing Nations (China, India). These states depend on secure transit through the Strait of Hormuz and could exert economic pressure on either party, yet their interests are absent from the bilateral narrative.

Iranian Public. Iran’s population faces soaring inflation and an export-dependent economy in collapse. The unfreezing of assets — whether as cash, as gradual access in exchange for goods, or as sanctions relief contingent on compliance — determines whether the economic conditions that made the war politically costly improve or stagnate. The Iranian public holds high urgency and a claim to legitimacy as the population bearing the economic consequences, but limited formal power — classified as dependent: affected by every term, represented by none.

Lebanese Population and State. Southern Lebanon is the theater of the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict and the geography over which the two deal accounts most sharply diverge. Lebanon’s government and civilian population hold high urgency and a legitimacy claim, but limited power — dependent stakeholders whose interests are shaped by parties whose primary concerns lie elsewhere.

Structural Tensions

The parties with the highest combined salience — the U.S. and Iran — are the ones presenting contradictory accounts of the same document. If the memorandum’s terms are ambiguous enough to support both accounts, the next 60 days of talks on nuclear restrictions and sanctions relief will be spent resolving what was already supposedly agreed. If the terms are not ambiguous and one side is misrepresenting them, the agreement’s durability depends on which account the text, when published, supports. The structural ambiguity functions, at minimum in the short term, as a design feature of a memorandum whose operational value is to pause hostilities and buy 60 days for further talks while each party claims victory.

Multiple stakeholders with high power or high urgency were either absent from the negotiations or positioned to act against the agreement’s terms. Katz has already said no withdrawal will occur. The IRGC controls the strait physically and has institutional incentives to monetize that control. Hezbollah operates independently of any state negotiating framework and retains the capacity to initiate hostilities that undermine the ceasefire function regardless of the bilateral MOU. Gulf states, absent from the reported talks, have interests that may diverge from both Washington’s and Tehran’s accounts. The agreement’s durability depends not only on what was signed but on whether these absent or dissenting parties choose to comply with, contest, or ignore its terms.

The asset question — which the Iranian public cares about most directly — remains contested at the level of mechanism even where the parties agree on the principle. Tehran says it will be able to sell oil without obstacles upon signature; Vance says significant sanctions relief follows only after compliance with nuclear and militant-funding commitments; Trump told the Journal Iran would not be provided cash; unnamed Middle East officials described an oil-for-food-style arrangement involving gradual access. These describe different timelines, different conditions, and different distributions of leverage over the coming 60-day negotiation. The sourcing hierarchy points to a practical problem: the principals — Trump and Vance on the U.S. side, Araghchi and Baghaei on the Iranian side — have made direct, attributable statements that contradict each other; the oil-for-food characterization, attributed to unnamed intermediary officials, occupies a lower rung. The discrepancy will be resolved only when the full text appears.

What the Text Will Reveal

When the full text is published, three indicators will reveal which set of interests will actually be served. The first is the language on strait transit — whether the text specifies toll-free access or permits charges for navigation, environmental protection, or insurance. The second is the linkage, or absence of linkage, to Israel’s military posture in Lebanon. The third is the sanctions-relief trigger mechanism — whether the text makes relief automatic upon signature, as Iran’s state media suggests, or conditions it on verifiable performance steps, as the American account maintains. That third variable directly determines whether Iran’s core economic interest is met and will shape the leverage balance during the 60-day negotiating window.

The full text will not resolve the stakeholder tensions. It will clarify which account is closer to what was actually agreed, and in doing so, it will reveal which absent stakeholders now face terms they did not negotiate and may not accept.

Analytical techniques used in this piece

This analysis applies the methods below. Each links to a short, plain-English explainer you can read and reuse.

Stakeholder Mapping
Charts the parties to a situation — their interests, power, and alignments.
Mutually Assured Destruction
Deterrence by guaranteeing that any attack is suicidal for the attacker.
Nash Equilibrium
A standoff where no party can do better by moving alone, so the stalemate holds.