Summary

  • The State Department has told Congress that Israel would need about $10 billion to pay for outstanding orders of U.S. military hardware beyond 2028, a figure that fixes the payment question on ground an announced aid cutoff does not reach.
  • A State Department letter to the office of Rep. Joaquin Castro states the requirements “could be covered either by FMF, national funds, or both,” leaving open whether American or Israeli funds settle the balance.
  • Legislation drafted to shift funding from foreign financing to joint defense production would change the category of the money rather than the amount owed, and the reporting states the proposal “would not resolve who pays for orders scheduled for delivery in the future.”
  • Current and former U.S. officials, including former State Department official Josh Paul, assess an abrupt end to military aid as unlikely because Congress has already committed funding.

A State Department document sent to Congress and reviewed by The Wall Street Journal shows that Israel would need about $10 billion to pay for outstanding orders of U.S. military hardware beyond 2028. The document counts the orders as of April 1, and the reporting states it was unclear how much that total might have changed since then. President Trump said Tuesday that he planned to end aid to Israel, a statement the reporting says caught Israeli officials, including some in the security establishment, off guard. The $10 billion figure measures what a policy announcement does not reach: purchases already placed, which the reporting says would still have to be paid for, and which give any phase-out of American funding a timetable of its own.

What the $10 billion figure measures

The Journal’s stated significance of the total is structural rather than political. The figure, the reporting says, shows “how hard it would be to phase out American funding for Israel, since purchases already made would still have to be paid for.”

That structure sits on long-term commitments. The most recent is a 10-year memorandum of understanding agreed to by the Obama administration that runs through 2028 and pledges $3.3 billion each year in Foreign Military Financing. The reporting separately records that the United States has already pledged nearly $7 billion in annual military aid over the next two years, and that Congress approved about $26 billion in additional support for Israel in 2024, at the height of Israel’s war in Gaza following the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas-led attack. The article does not state how the $3.3 billion annual Foreign Military Financing baseline relates to the “nearly $7 billion” two-year figure; the reporting presents them as separate commitments.

The funding is structured to let Israel use pledged future money to buy equipment before the money arrives — a system the reporting says gives American and Israeli officials more flexibility in shipping weapons to the country. Israel receives about $3.3 billion a year that can be used to buy U.S.-made hardware, including bombs, vehicles and jet fighters, making it one of the largest recipients of American military aid in the world. Cumulative assistance, per the Congressional Research Service, totals about $174 billion from Israel’s founding in 1948 through May 2025, not adjusted for inflation.

Who settles the ledger

The payment question has a documentary location. A State Department letter to the office of Rep. Joaquin Castro (D., Texas), who inquired about the funds earlier this year, states that the requirements “could be covered either by FMF, national funds, or both,” meaning either the United States or Israel could end up paying for the orders. Castro said in an interview, “Even if the MOU ran its full course to 2028, there’s still $10 billion above and beyond that, and there’s an issue of who’s going to pay for that.” The State Department did not respond to a request for comment.

The reporting records that current and former U.S. officials say an abrupt end to American military aid to Israel is unlikely. Josh Paul, a former State Department official who resigned during the Biden administration to protest its support for the war in Gaza, said, “It’s not plausible we stop by the end of this year” because Congress has already committed funding. Paul, who said he would support an aid shutdown, added, “We’ve not seen anything yet to substantiate this.”

What happens next

The near-term sequence runs through obligations already incurred rather than through a new decision. The memorandum of understanding runs through 2028 at $3.3 billion a year in Foreign Military Financing; Congress has approved about $26 billion in additional support in 2024; and the orders counted in the State Department document were placed as of April 1.

The intermediate sequence runs through a legislative vehicle. American lawmakers have drafted legislation that would shift funding from foreign financing to defense investments and joint production of military technologies. The co-production proposal would write U.S.-Israel military cooperation into U.S. law as part of the National Defense Authorization Act, which the reporting describes as “expected to be completed by the end of the year.”

The long sequence runs against a statutory floor. Ending American aid would run up against existing U.S. law, which commits the government to ensuring that its military exports give Israel a “qualitative military edge” over potential rivals; the reporting states that cutting off aid would make that more difficult. On the Israeli side, the country now spends around 7% of its gross domestic product on defense, more than any North Atlantic Treaty Organization member, even with U.S. aid, and the reporting states that paying for more of its own weapons could mean an increase in military spending after years of historically high outlays during recent conflicts. The article’s own timing assessment: “Unwinding the current system would likely take years.”

U.S. and Israeli officials have been discussing a potential phasing out of American military aid for months. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said the country should eventually wean itself off U.S. aid, proposing to eliminate direct aid over the coming decade.

The co-production draft: what it changes and what it does not

Advocates of the legislation said it would make it easier for the Pentagon to cooperate with Israel on procuring military technologies, and proponents hope it builds on past successes in defense cooperation, such as Israel’s Iron Dome air-defense system, which included the participation of American firms.

Critics said the proposal would embed Israel deeper into Pentagon supply chains and programs in a way that “would make such cooperation more difficult to repeal in a future Congress.” Co-operation written into statute is not renewed annually, and each year of co-production narrows the set of reversal options available to future Congresses.

The reporting records two limits on what the draft accomplishes. It “would not resolve who pays for orders scheduled for delivery in the future,” such as Israel’s plan to buy a squadron of 25 new advanced F-35 jet fighters, and it “would not address Israel’s immediate needs, which remain dependent on the regular flow of American-made armaments, including thousands of bombs the United States delivered in recent years during the wars.” Castro’s framing addresses the residual directly: “Even if the MOU ran its full course to 2028, there’s still $10 billion above and beyond that, and there’s an issue of who’s going to pay for that.”

Where the reporting places the case against each course

Against the aid cut, from the same reporting: Paul’s assessment that “It’s not plausible we stop by the end of this year” and “We’ve not seen anything yet to substantiate this”; the qualitative-military-edge statute; and “Unwinding the current system would likely take years.”

Grounds of caution attaching to the Tuesday statement, all supplied by the reporting: Congress has already committed funding and the orders counted in the document are placed; the total is counted as of April 1 and it was unclear how much it might have changed since; and the co-production framework would not settle payment for future deliveries.

Weighed against those, the reporting’s own quantities describe movement on the same ground on which the memorandum’s renewal and any future negotiation will occur — the Michigan result, Vice President JD Vance’s electoral post-mortem, and Netanyahu’s stated intention to wean the country off aid over the coming decade — but they move against a stock rather than a flow. The Congressional Research Service records about $174 billion in military assistance and funding from 1948 through May 2025, not adjusted for inflation.

The article’s own framing treats the overhang as shared: Israel’s $10 billion in outstanding orders “illustrates the challenge facing both critics of Israel who want to cut military aid and supporters who want to switch from aid to military co-production.”

Who holds a stake

The White House. Trump said ending direct aid would deprive Democratic critics of Israel of a political talking point, a reference to the campaign of Abdul El-Sayed, who was elected Tuesday as the first Muslim to serve in the U.S. Senate from Michigan and who campaigned on ending unconditional aid to Israel. The announcement caught Israeli officials off guard; the funding structure described in the reporting places the near-term direction of the announcement inside existing commitments.

The State Department and congressional appropriators. They hold the record on the ledger. The letter to Castro states the requirements “could be covered either by FMF, national funds, or both,” and the department did not respond to a request for comment. Congressional appropriators and the Armed Services committees carry the power and, with the National Defense Authorization Act timeline, the urgency. Castro’s inquiry and the department’s written reply place him at the point where the payment question is being asked.

The Israeli government. Netanyahu has proposed eliminating direct aid over the coming decade, and U.S. and Israeli officials have been discussing a potential phasing out for months. The Israeli security establishment was reported as caught off guard. Israeli taxpayers would absorb the fiscal effect of higher defense spending, with limited power over U.S. legislative mechanics.

Proponents and critics of the co-production legislation. The article reports proponents’ stated rationale and the National Defense Authorization Act timing, and critics’ supply-chain objection.

The Pentagon and the U.S. defense industrial base. Both hold position through the co-production and F-35 arrangements on a medium-term horizon.

Domestic political actors. El-Sayed’s constituency and Democratic critics of aid hold legitimacy and, after the Michigan result, increased political urgency. Factions within the Republican Party addressed by Vance’s posts hold power and urgency.

Least visible, most durable stakes. Future Congresses, whose repeal capacity the critics’ objection is entirely about, and the populations of Gaza and the wider region, whose circumstances the reporting records through health-authority figures but who hold no position in the U.S. aid mechanism itself.

How the change is being framed

The shift comes amid declining support for Israel in both parties, following years of war in Gaza and Lebanon and this year’s joint American-Israeli attack on Iran. Democrats have focused on Israel’s conduct in the war in Gaza, which has destroyed much of the enclave and killed more than 74,000 Palestinians, according to Palestinian health authorities, which do not say how many were combatants.

The issue has also exposed tensions within the Republican Party. Vance, in a post on X, cited the war in Iran and the U.S. relationship with Israel among the top reasons voters went against Republicans in an election that produced major Republican losses in Congress. In a separate post Wednesday, Vance cited polling listing the top policy changes that would regain Republican support, including ending the war in Iran and changing the U.S. relationship with Israel.

Sourcing notes

Figures here are carried as reported by The Wall Street Journal and attributed where the reporting attributes them. Independent corroboration from additional published sources was not established for several article-supplied facts: the $10 billion State Department figure; El-Sayed’s Michigan election result; the Gaza death-toll figure and its attribution; the Congressional Research Service total; the joint American-Israeli attack on Iran; the defense-spending comparison to NATO members; and the 25-aircraft F-35 order. The reporting’s own qualifications are preserved throughout — the April 1 dating of the count and the statement that it was unclear how much the total might have changed, “according to Palestinian health authorities, which do not say how many were combatants,” the “around” 7% figure and the NATO comparison, and the Congressional Research Service total “not adjusted for inflation.”

Analytical techniques used in this piece

This analysis applies the methods below. Each links to a short, plain-English explainer you can read and reuse.

Consequences & Sequels
Plays a decision forward to its first- and second-order consequences.
Red-Team Advocate
Argues the adversary’s case in full to expose what a plan underrates.
Stakeholder Mapping
Charts the parties to a situation — their interests, power, and alignments.
Incentives
People respond to the rewards a system actually pays out — often not the ones it intends.