Porter argues yuan pressure is more effective than transhipment enforcement
The White House released a report titled “The Great Transhipment Scam” and unveiled an AI-powered border scanning tool intended to detect Chinese goods rerouted through Mexico, Vietnam, and other third countries, according to a Guardian opinion column by Eduardo Porter. The Commerce Department estimates, cited in Porter’s column, that $67 billion in Chinese goods were transhipped through Mexico, India, and Vietnam in 2025.
Porter’s Guardian column reported that trade adviser Peter Navarro, speaking Thursday, criticized Chinese motors being bolted onto recliners imported from Vietnam as evidence of transhipment.
The White House report singled out manufacturing communities in Milwaukee, Cleveland, Toledo, Hickory, Phoenix, and Youngstown as affected by transhipment. It said that “when power supplies, control panels, aluminum sheet, valves, plastics, or furniture components are rerouted from China through Mexico, Vietnam, Malaysia, Poland, or the UAE, they destroy or reduce jobs in Milwaukee, Cleveland, Toledo, Hickory, Phoenix, Youngstown, and dozens of other American manufacturing communities.” The new tool, described in the report as a border “detective” that “never sleeps, never tires, and never forgets,” is intended to scan every bill of lading and shipping manifest to identify rerouted goods and penalize the importers.
The transhipment enforcement effort is the latest step in the ongoing tariff dispute. The administration’s tariff strategy was paused last October after China threatened to cut the United States off from rare-earth magnets, prompting a truce that has held since. Imports from China have fallen 40% in the year to June 2026 compared with the same period in 2024, according to Porter’s column. US manufacturing employment remains roughly unchanged since Trump first came into office, despite two and a half administrations’ efforts to boost manufacturing.
Porter argued in his Guardian column that the administration’s reliance on transhipment enforcement would not restore factory jobs or significantly reduce the import bill. He identified the undervalued Chinese yuan as a central driver of Chinese export dominance — a force he described as “swamping” the US economy and threatening industrial development worldwide. Porter pushed back against economists who treat the exchange rate as a “symptom, not the disease,” writing that the call to wait for Beijing to support household spending “has the taste of those old exhortations to wait for China’s multiparty democracy to flourish.” “But give us a break,” Porter wrote.
The scale of Chinese exports has expanded dramatically over the past three decades. China’s share of global manufacturing exports has risen from 3% to 20% since 1995, according to Porter, and China now accounts for over half the global exports of hundreds of manufacturing products. China’s current account surplus equals approximately 5% of its GDP, a figure Porter called a “huge drawdown on worldwide demand.”
The broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar index, which measures the dollar’s value against a basket of major currencies, sat at 118.9 as of mid-August 2026, reflecting the dollar’s persistent strength. Porter acknowledged that the yuan’s weakness and the dollar’s strength reflect underlying economic dynamics — including China’s depressed household consumption and the US budget deficit — but argued that pressure on the exchange rate could provide a catalyst for the broader policy changes needed.
Historical examples suggest exchange-rate coordination can shift trade balances. The 1985 Plaza Accord, which weakened the dollar against the Japanese yen, helped reduce the US trade deficit with Japan. Porter noted that China’s external surplus contracted sharply as the yuan appreciated after the 2008 global financial crisis, and that the slide in China’s currency has underpinned a rising external surplus since 2023.
Brad Setser of the Council on Foreign Relations, cited in Porter’s column, said currency adjustment has historically driven the economic realignment needed to reduce Chinese exports. Gene Frieda of the London School of Economics, quoted in Porter’s column, said: “The barrier to progress is not policy design; it is policy preference.”
The US has authority under Section 301 of the Trade Act to impose tariffs on countries that purposely undervalue their currencies, according to Porter. Europe, he noted, lacks an equivalent provision but could impose tariffs to stop a surge of Chinese imports, as sanctioned by the World Trade Organization, and link that protection to China’s exchange-rate management.
Porter acknowledged in his Guardian column that persuading Beijing to change its exchange-rate policy would not be straightforward. He noted that “Washington must be smart about deploying section 301 in this way — not its forte,” and that any pressure campaign would need to include allies in Europe and elsewhere to be effective. Porter concluded that currency-focused intervention, in his assessment, offers a more promising path than continuing to pursue transhipment enforcement as a primary strategy.