$6.3bn was stolen from the world’s largest cryptocurrency exchange, and its customers still have no government backstop. It began with an engineer’s laptop — one compromised machine, the point of entry — and Binance has since disclosed additional points of breach. More than $2.5bn left in a single transaction after attackers used that machine to reach customer wallets. The exchange froze about half the money the thieves came for and promised to cover all of it. Binance says user funds are safe. It says it will cover all losses. It says proof of reserves.

In the US, the UK and Australia, crypto customers generally have no formal deposit protection: no statutory deposit-insurance mechanism guarantees them reimbursement if an exchange is hacked or goes bankrupt. No government reimburses them under those deposit-protection regimes. Not a cent.

While the executives were writing statements, the customers were leaving. By Sunday, Binance had processed $4.6bn in withdrawals against $1bn in deposits — a net outflow of about $3.64bn, 2.1% of its $171bn in assets under management — and American investors pulled money out of Bitcoin exchange-traded funds too. Cofounder Yi He put security first, then withdrawals, then Binance’s resumption. The customer was the one waiting.

Then the second wave came wearing the company’s name: digitally altered screenshots promising $150 in free compensation to customers whose withdrawals had been suspended. Changpeng Zhao, the former chief executive, warned that crypto scammers were in “overdrive.” Binance called the screenshots false.

I will not dwell on the altered screenshots. That is merely the next hand in the old game: after the theft comes the counterfeit receipt.

Investigators suspect a North Korean hacking unit. The largest online theft in the world — the biggest vault in crypto fell to them.

Before the laptop, there was the plea. Binance’s former chief executive, Changpeng Zhao, pleaded guilty in 2023 to violating U.S. anti-money laundering laws and stepped down. The name was already in the courthouse.

I will not mention that Binance was accused, before anyone took anything from it, of profiting off crypto criminals. Not my business. I will not mention it twice.

The laptop was the door; Binance’s control of the wallets and customer balances was the lever. One private institution held the wallets, wrote the custody rules, set the risk controls and could move the customer’s money. That concentration turned one compromised workstation into a breach of the whole system, and Binance has said there were other points of breach besides. That is the class: the custodial exchange — a private intermediary holding other people’s wealth while the law, in those countries, leaves the loss with the depositor unless the company chooses to absorb it. His Safe Hands: the exchange, the issuer of its own numbers and the insurer at once, and nobody standing behind the exchange. The company keeps control. The customer keeps the legal risk. A brand is not a regulator.

A proof of reserves is the exchange’s representation of the assets it says it holds. Deposit protection is something else: a backstop that pays when the custodian fails. One is a statement about what sits in the vault; the other is a legal mechanism standing behind it. Binance has offered the first. For a crypto customer in the US, the UK or Australia, it is the only one available. Custody without a backstop turns a company’s reputation into its only insurance policy, and a reputation is not a statute. The premium on that policy is the fee on the trade. The customer pays it in the currency of trusting a firm whose promise is backed by nothing, because the law has an opinion about the thief and no deposit guarantee for the customer.

Again.

And the docket is familiar. The FAA had delegated much of the 737 MAX certification authority to Boeing; 346 people died in two crashes, and Boeing’s January 2021 deferred prosecution agreement admitted that two of its pilots “deceived the FAA” about the MCAS system, that the company withheld critical information from the agency, and more than $2.5bn in penalties and victim compensation. GM knew for roughly a decade that its ignition switch could shut off engines and disable airbags; 124 deaths were tied to the defect, GM agreed to pay $900m in criminal penalties, and no individual was charged. HSBC admitted to a money-laundering conspiracy involving proceeds from drug traffickers and payments involving sanctioned countries; it paid $1.9bn under a deferred prosecution agreement, including $1.256bn in forfeiture, and no individual was prosecuted in that resolution.

The pattern is not corporate wrongdoing in the abstract. It is the private gatekeeper deciding who bears the loss, and the law settling up with the institution because the institution can pay. The corporate check clears. The bill lands elsewhere. In Binance’s case the check has not even been written. It is a promise, and the customer is holding it.

Legal punishment and deposit protection solve different problems. Prosecutors can punish fraud. Courts can adjudicate anticompetitive conduct: in April, a Manhattan jury found Live Nation had illegally maintained a monopoly, and found that Ticketmaster had overcharged concertgoers by $1.72 a ticket at major venues in the state where the case was brought. Regulators can penalise banks. Those powers act after the harm; they can put a thief in prison or make an institution pay a penalty. They do not guarantee a crypto customer a dollar when the exchange itself fails. Deposit protection is designed for the moment the custodian fails.

This is not FTX. The distinction matters. But the customer problem is architectural: without formal deposit protection, a balance is a claim against the custodian, not a guarantee against the custodian’s failure. Binance may make good on its promise. The customer still has no statutory backstop if it cannot.

Here is the sentence. His Safe Hands audits itself, insures itself, and answers for itself. Binance says it will cover the loss because it says it will, because the brand is worth more than the check, and because a brand is the only deposit insurance a crypto customer gets. A promise on X and a balance sheet, and nothing else behind them.

The vault keeps the fee. The customer keeps the risk. And the law that insures money in a bank was never written for money in a vault. No backstop.