Trump starved Cuba of fuel and then sold the fuel back at a markup. The executive order came in January. The export licenses came weeks later. The barrels have not stopped moving since.
The shop keeps a Honda EU2200i for January mornings when ice takes a line down and the compressor won’t turn over, and I fill my own cans at the co-op off Highway 13 and pay what the pump says, same as everybody on this road. A couple winters back the LP price spiked and half my snowmobile customers parked their machines for the season rather than pay it. That is what fuel does at the household edge. It doesn’t get debated. It just gets quit. So when the President signed the order in January [threatening tariffs on oil shipments to Cuba] and started calling the whole apparatus his “ironclad energy blockade,” I did what I do with any policy sold as strength. I watched what it did.
Cuba got the full version. By May its own government said it was out of fuel oil and diesel outright. Oniel Díaz Castellanos, who runs a consulting service for businesses in Cuba, told the Journal the streets had been “absolutely empty.” Most of the island gets electricity a few hours a day, and families run small generators to keep food from spoiling in the heat. That is the condition the order produced.
Here is how the supply actually stopped. U.S. forces captured Venezuela’s president, Nicolás Maduro, in January, and the subsidized Venezuelan tankers stopped with him. The blockade has kept every other supplier out, Mexico included. Since the order went down, exactly one tanker from anywhere else — one, Russian — has docked on the island. Close the supply. Wall off the substitutes. Open a channel for your own exporters and sell into the hole. The embargo built the shortage. The license sells into it. That is a racket with a sanctions list attached.
What built came right behind it. U.S. rules allow fuel to move only to private Cuban companies and individuals, under an exemption called Support for the Cuban People. Dozens of American companies took the license, most of them out of south Florida, shipping from Port Everglades, Jacksonville, and Houston. They put a shuttle fleet on the water: small ships hauling ISO tanks and fuel containers back and forth across the strait. Crowley, whose spokesman David DeCamp said the company moves goods between the U.S. and Cuba only with U.S. approval, put Barge 455-4 on the Port Everglades-to-Mariel run again and again in August and September. On September 26 it brought in nearly a hundred tanks of gasoline and diesel. Three days later it was back at Port Everglades, loading for the return trip. One empty tank in that same corridor had already made at least two round trips to Cuba this year; it sat at Mariel from September 26 until October 17, then went home to its shipper. Nothing in this trade moves without American permission.
Daniel Yergin spent a whole book, The Prize, on one lesson: fuel does not obey slogans. It follows tankers and contracts, and a blockade never makes fuel disappear — it decides who holds the paperwork on the next barrel. The paperwork this year is American, and so is the money. U.S. ports shipped more than 1.6 million barrels into Cuba through August, worth more than $230 million, on the Census Bureau’s count. Main Street Independent ran the September numbers: the United States is Cuba’s top supplier for 2026, with a record $674 million in shipments. The exporters who would talk only anonymously said margins ran above fifty percent early in the year, squeezed toward twenty as more licensed sellers piled into the same captive market. Fifty points of margin is worth having. It is just not worth signing. An exemption named for the Cuban people is the paperwork on that margin. The Cuban government, for its part, puts this year’s cost of the embargo at a record $8.08 billion. Two ledgers, one policy, both at record pace in the same year.
On the island, most state-run gas stations are still closed under the sanctions, and informal private depots have spread through Havana — a nondescript building, dozens of large plastic containers of fuel, cars pulling in and out. Cuba legalized private fuel sales this year, wholesale first and now retail, and has begun renting its own CUPET stations to private distributors to move the imported fuel. Wendell Berry named the underlying mentality in The Unsettling of America: extraction destroys the membership before it destroys the economy. Watch the membership here. It is being reorganized into a distribution network for a foreign embargo, and the cost of that transition is being paid in spoiled food and dark houses. The state-run economy is in its worst crisis since the Soviet Union collapsed.
Seven interconnected power plants, built decades ago and running far past their intended lifespans, carry about forty percent of the island’s electricity, and in the judgment of Jorge Piñon, a Cuban energy expert at the University of Texas, Cuban oil production is enough to run them. Another forty percent comes from small stations burning imported fuel, and that is exactly where the embargo lands hardest — on the trucks, the generators, the private businesses, and the households, not on the state’s own wells.
There is a name for this move in the conservative-contradictions taxonomy: the Nationalist Shell Game, what Chapter 16 of We Too calls nationalist rhetoric running cover for a private bill of sale. The vocabulary is old. Yergin traces “energy security” back to the 1973 embargo, when a supply cut by Arab producers turned fuel into a question of national honor; in the decades since, the phrase has been made to cover almost anything, up to and including an arrangement where the blockading country sells the fuel. The rhetoric this year is total — ironclad, no dealings, fundamental change. The output is a market: an island that cannot buy fuel from anyone but the country besieging it, supplied by dozens of American sellers at prices a captive customer has no choice but to meet. The exporters are American. The margins are American. The ships move with American approval. The shortage is Cuban, and so are the blackout, the plastic drum, the reservation in an app, and the food that spoils when the generator runs dry. Cuba plays both parts here. It is the enemy in the press release and the customer on the manifest.
And the blockade does not hold on its own terms. U.S. rules bar sales to Cuban government entities, which is why most state gas stations in Havana sit dark — but during a Journal visit in September two of them were running, with lines spilling into the road and drivers holding reservations through CUPET’s app. John Kavulich, who tracks the Cuban business environment for the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, put it flatly: “There is seepage right now… If you want zero fuel getting into the hands of the government, you’d have to shut it all down.” U.S. authorities seized $3 million in fuel last month that they said was being funneled to a state-owned enterprise; Cuba’s government denies any involvement. The sanctions list grows almost weekly, every exporter re-screens it, and the tanks load anyway. A siege you have to re-patrol every week is not a siege. It is a franchise with paperwork.
The same test cuts both ways here, and both cuts land the same way. Carlos Luis Méndez, Cuba’s deputy minister for foreign trade and investment, called it “ironic” that Washington appears intent on making his island dependent on American fuel, and called the arrangement “completely unacceptable.” He is not a witness I would lean on. But the trade data are public, and he read them right. A White House spokeswoman declined to respond to that allegation and said the administration is seeking a “fundamental change” in Cuba; the Treasury Department did not respond to a request for comment. And this machine did not start in January — more than six decades of American effort have gone into walling that island off. What changed this year is that the wall grew a loading dock.
An honest version of this policy would say what it is. If the object is the Cuban people, sell them fuel openly and publish every barrel it moves. If the object is pressure on the regime, enforce it and say so, instead of running sales your own enforcement people describe as seepage. What you do not get to do is starve a country and invoice it for the groceries.
That line of cars at a state-run station in Havana in September is what this bought: drivers holding reservations through an app, American fuel sitting in plastic drums a few blocks away, and the barge still making the run — Port Everglades to Mariel, gasoline and diesel going down, back at the dock three days later to load again, on schedule, through a blockade. Trump starved Cuba of fuel. Then he sold the fuel back at a markup. Nothing in the record makes them two different policies.
I cannot inspect that corridor from my bench, and I do not set the policy. The diesel in my own tank came up the same Gulf coast, so I am not outside this arrangement either. But a trade worth fifty points of margin that nobody will sign his name to has a name in the record, and Smedley Butler spent thirty-three years in uniform learning it: “War is a racket. I spent thirty-three years as a high-class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street and for the bankers.”