Eighty-six thousand American houses answer to a single balance sheet in Dallas, and the sharpest pencil in the market has drafted the arithmetic for taking them apart. Jonathan Litt’s Land & Buildings Investment Management — an activist fund holding less than one percent of Invitation Homes — plans to send the company’s shareholders a letter, a copy of which has been viewed by the Wall Street Journal, urging the company to keep selling its houses “one at a time,” to return at least $2 billion a year to its owners, and to accept that this may go on “even if that ultimately means liquidating the Company.” Invitation owns nearly 86,000 single-family rentals, worth about $15.5 billion in the market; the stock has fallen more than 30 percent over five years, closing Friday at $26.85 against the $45 a share Litt figures the houses underneath are worth. That is not a housing plan. It is a confession.
Let the letter have its honest points first, because they are real. A company trading at sixty cents on the dollar of its own assets is sending a signal somebody has to answer, and a board does owe its owners a return; that is the fiduciary bargain, and cynicism adds nothing to it. A new federal law — the ban the president called for in January, now set to take effect — will bar institutional investors controlling 350 or more single-family homes from buying more, and it genuinely caps the company’s growth; Litt reads that aright, even if, as our own reporting carried in March, the economists are candid that a buying ban alone will not fill the country’s housing gap. And buried in the demands is the letter’s one genuinely good idea: a 6 percent down-payment rebate for tenants who buy the house they already live in. For one clause, the tenant appears in the ledger as what he actually is — a family that might own the ground under its own feet. Granted, all of it. Now read the letter for what it does not contain.
Not one street. Not one town. Not one family. There are “net assets” and “returning capital” and share repurchases, and there is a tenant offered six percent to leave. I used to trade futures on corn before the seed went into the ground — paper claims on crops grown by men whose names I never learned, in counties I never visited. When a position trades below the value of what backs it, the desk has one move: sell the assets, close the position, hand the money back. I recognize the handwriting. It is the handwriting of a wind-down. And when a thing you have never seen is worth precisely what a model says it is worth, the people living inside the model are not the point. The difference this time is that the asset is not a bushel. It is the roof over somebody’s head, and the somebody is a rounding error.
Conservatism used to have a word for what a house is. It is the one piece of productive property most American families will ever hold — the wide ownership Belloc and Chesterton preached and this country practiced without knowing its name. Edmund Burke called society “a partnership between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born”; the family house is that partnership in siding and shingle, held, improved, and handed on. Pius XI called it “a grave evil” to assign to a higher association what a lesser one can do for itself, and there is no association smaller or more competent than a household deciding the color of its own siding and the timing of its own furnace. A company holding 86,000 houses inverts that on principle: the roof, the rent, the repair schedule govern from a boardroom half a country away, answering to owners who will never stand in the driveway. Sever the house from the household and you have not made an investment. You have unmade a citizen’s independence.
Conserve what, exactly? The movement that spent two generations preaching the ownership society — the deed as the little platoon, the mortgage as the sacrament of the free household — watched concentrated capital convert the single-family house into a rent-stream for strangers and blessed it as market freedom. Leo XIII wrote the great encyclical defending private property; go back and read whose property he meant. He meant the wage-earner’s — property as the wall between a family and dependence — and he bound even that wall to the good of all. Chesterton’s old diagnosis, that the trouble was never too much capital but too few capitalists, has never been more literal. You hand me a letter recommending that the best use of American houses is to buy back stock. The letter is the shortage, itemized.
To his credit, Litt says the quiet part plainly — liquidation on the table, in writing. The movement that claims to conserve cannot say it, because the movement is invested. The company’s chief executive, Dallas Tanner, answers that Invitation can live within the new rules, and the selling has already begun: last quarter the company moved more than 600 houses out the door, bought over 200 more, and spent $245 million retiring its own shares — houses out, paper in. Follow the value and the picture completes. The houses will be sold to whoever bids, and the money returned to shareholders, every one of them a stranger to the driveways in question. The tenant’s stake in all this is the 6 percent rebate — a tip left on a $2 billion table.
I write from Adams County, Wisconsin, where housing has been somebody else’s asset class before. Of the 16,692 housing units the census counted here in 2020, nearly half stand vacant — overwhelmingly seasonal, owned from elsewhere, their subdivisions strung along Castle Rock and Petenwell for people whose week begins on Friday night. That is what a house becomes when it is severed from the family that lives in it. The county does it slowly; Dallas does it by the thousand. The town’s children serve the owners’ weekends at wages that cannot buy the houses back. It is why the drive to bar the big buyers found its audience — and why both parties now agree that eighty-six thousand homes in one pair of hands is a problem while neither proposes to put them back where a family can hold them. A ceiling on concentration is a Brandeis instinct — the curse of bigness is a real curse — but a cap only decides who may buy the next house; it does not give anyone a house.
So take the letter at its word, and correct its arithmetic. Yes: the houses are worth more sold than held. Sold — first — to the family living in them, at appraisal, with real financing, as the rule and not a 6 percent courtesy: a rent credit accruing month by month toward the deed, so that the rebate is not a tip on the way out the door but the first payment on the way in. Fold the rest into housing co-ops owned by their own tenants — one member, one vote, the way the lines here belong to the 31,560 member-households of Adams-Columbia Electric Cooperative, with its office in this village. That is the same member-owned form the REA financed in 1936, when cheap credit went out behind cooperatives and farms the market had written off got power anyway; it has been done before, and it is kept. Take the rest through a credit union that knows the borrower’s name the way the co-op knows a member’s, and let the shareholders take their two billion while the families take the deeds — ownership ending up wide enough that no block of interests can hold a town’s front doors.
It is harder here than anywhere. The houses are already encumbered, the buyers are already seasonal, and nobody in Friendship has fifteen billion dollars. It will be slower than liquidation and earn thinner returns, and its meetings will run long over roofs and furnaces, and its members will have to show up — which is the entire difference between owning a house and holding a position. A statute can fence the field; only institutions put families on it. The familiar to the unknown, the actual to the possible. The earth was given for all. The house was built for somebody. Leave the town its life — and sell them one at a time, to the people behind the doors.