Summary

  • Claire Finkelstein urges leaders of the 120th Congress to pursue sustained oversight and possible impeachment investigations of administration officials because the investigations can strengthen congressional authority even if Donald Trump is not removed.
  • Finkelstein attributes the weakened authority of Congress to procedural choices during the first two Trump impeachments that allowed presidential resistance to limit witness participation.
  • Finkelstein says beginning impeachment investigations with officials other than Trump could give subpoenas a defined legal purpose and a firmer basis against separation-of-powers objections and presidential privilege.
  • Finkelstein’s strategy depends on durable, nonpartisan standards governing coercive investigations, because partisan resistance could otherwise replace presidential and legal objections.

In a Nov. 4 commentary in The Guardian, law professor Claire Finkelstein urged leaders of the 120th Congress to pursue sustained oversight and possible impeachment investigations of administration officials after what she described as Democratic victories in both chambers in the 2026 midterms. Finkelstein’s central claim is institutional rather than removal-centered: investigations could give congressional subpoenas a firmer legal footing, allow Congress to compel testimony over sustained periods and restore oversight authority even though a third Trump impeachment is highly unlikely to result in removal. The strategy matters because Finkelstein treats Congress’s power to obtain information as an institutional end in its own right. Her historical account identifies procedural choices during the first two Trump impeachments as the mechanism that weakened that power, while the unresolved question is whether coercive investigative tools remain legitimate when removal is remote and partisan division can determine their use.

Why authority, not removal, is the objective

Finkelstein separates the question of whether Trump should be removed from the question of whether Congress can require executive-branch officials to testify. She proposes opening impeachment investigations against several administration officials rather than beginning with Trump. Her affirmative case for that sequence does not depend on producing a conviction or a removal vote. Opening investigations against multiple officials could give congressional subpoenas a firmer footing against separation-of-powers objections, while the removal-centered route remains highly unlikely to succeed.

That distinction allows Congress to pursue information-gathering and subpoena enforcement independently of a removal outcome. A long, slow investigation could enhance transparency, require executive-branch officials to provide public testimony on disputed subjects and allow Congress to reassert its authority over testimony. Public hearings, sustained subpoenas and methodical enforcement could change the default relationship between a president who resists congressional questioning and a Congress prepared to compel answers.

Finkelstein’s proposal also has a political dimension. House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries said impeachment would be “on the menu” if the House changed hands. Finkelstein said Democratic leaders had refused to support efforts to impeach Trump a third time and asked lawmakers to weigh the costs and benefits of a proceeding unlikely to result in removal. She identified the oversight benefits of a long, slow investigation as the positive side of that calculation. The intended gain is therefore stronger congressional authority, greater transparency and restored institutional control over information rather than reliance on presidential removal.

How the earlier impeachments weakened congressional authority

Finkelstein characterized the first Trump impeachment, which arose over the alleged withholding of U.S. aid to Ukraine, as a “lamentable circularity” because Congress’s effort to investigate obstruction of Congress was itself obstructed. Trump blocked key administration witnesses by asserting executive privilege and testimonial immunity, Finkelstein said, and some two dozen witnesses ultimately testified.

House impeachment managers, according to Finkelstein, largely stopped short of forcing the most critical witnesses to appear, including Vice President Mike Pence, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Adviser John Bolton. The only subpoena the managers pursued was against White House lawyer Don McGahn. A two-year court battle produced negotiated testimony that Finkelstein said was too little and arrived too late.

Finkelstein said the same error was repeated during the second Trump impeachment in 2021, when the Senate reversed a vote to call witnesses and then called none. Testimony from people close to Trump about Jan. 6, 2021, could have provided “critical fodder” for special counsel Jack Smith’s criminal indictment of Trump during the Biden administration and, more importantly for Finkelstein’s institutional argument, could have strengthened Congress’s oversight authority.

Her conclusion is that the two impeachments reinforced congressional ineffectiveness because presidents controlled the processes used to judge their own conduct. Finkelstein viewed that dynamic as weakening Congress’s ability to investigate and compel testimony. The institutional cost of failing to secure witnesses extended beyond the immediate impeachment proceedings because the earlier confrontations established that resistance could limit the information available to Congress.

Finkelstein’s legal-constitutional argument treats the Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in United States v. Mazars as the central constraint her proposal seeks to address. She reads the ruling as showing that separation-of-powers objections might outweigh congressional oversight authority without a “clear legislative aim.” The reporting attributes that formulation to Finkelstein without setting out the ruling’s precise scope.

Finkelstein argued that the first impeachment ended too quickly for House subpoenas concerning Trump’s tax returns and other financial records to issue incident to an inquiry. She said the Mazars case would have come out differently if the first impeachment had continued long enough to issue those subpoenas.

Beginning impeachment investigations with administration officials would give the ensuing subpoenas a defined legal purpose. In Finkelstein’s account, that purpose would provide a firmer basis against Mazars-type objections and the assertions of presidential privilege that Trump would inevitably make. The investigation would thus be designed to strengthen the legal footing of evidence-gathering before Congress confronts whether the executive branch must comply.

Finkelstein cited Republican Rep. Thomas Massie of Kentucky, who filed articles of impeachment against Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, calling that a “smart strategy.” The supplied reporting does not independently establish the filing’s date or procedural status. Beginning with a Cabinet member rather than Trump could force cooperation while limiting presidential interference, Finkelstein said, and she drew an analogy to prosecutors’ experience prosecuting organized crime.

Alongside the investigations, Finkelstein urged Congress to adopt internal ethics measures intended to eliminate conflicts of interest and strengthen institutional integrity. The measures were presented as a complementary check on congressional power, although the reporting does not explain how the proposed ethics rules would be enforced or how those rules would constrain investigations.

Oversight where legislation may remain blocked

Finkelstein described the obstacles to Democratic legislation as nearly insuperable despite Democratic control of both chambers. She cited divisions within Democrats, the Senate filibuster and the need to negotiate with Trump to head off what she called the inevitable veto on most, if not all, Democratic-led reforms.

Oversight could still produce institutional consequences when legislative agendas remain blocked. Congressional control could change who controls the flow of testimony and information even if Congress does not enact the policy sought by either party. The strategy would also alter the burden on both sides. A president resisting testimony would confront an investigation and an enforcement record rather than rely only on an assertion of privilege, while a Congress seeking testimony would have to articulate a specific investigative aim and persist through enforcement.

Several questions would determine whether that mechanism strengthened or weakened Congress. The reporting does not establish how the Supreme Court would rule on subpoenas issued through Finkelstein’s sequence, whether congressional and public support would persist, or whether repeated use of coercive investigative authority would strengthen the institution or devalue it.

The unresolved legitimacy of coercive oversight

Finkelstein’s legal-constitutional account asks whether an impeachment investigation can provide a legally sufficient basis for subpoenas resistant to executive privilege and separation-of-powers objections. Her democratic-repair account asks whether sustained evidence-gathering can restore Congress’s demonstrated authority to obtain testimony. The removal-centered political question is whether a proceeding unlikely to produce removal can justify the exercise of coercive investigative tools at all.

Finkelstein acknowledged that newly strengthened oversight powers could be “weaponized against a law-abiding occupant of the Oval Office,” although she assessed an overly powerful Congress as a distant and unlikely threat at that point. Her institutional-repair position and her restraint concern share several procedural controls: the executive branch should not control the conditions of a congressional investigation, investigative authority should rest on a defined legal purpose, and courts should retain a role in testing separation-of-powers objections.

The positions do not converge on whether coercive investigative tools remain legitimate when removal is not a realistic outcome. The institutional-repair position evaluates legitimacy chiefly by whether Congress can expose conduct and obtain information. The restraint concern evaluates legitimacy chiefly by whether a political majority may use coercive investigative tools without a realistic prospect of removal. Procedure alone cannot settle the disagreement because the two positions assign different significance to the fair use of that procedure.

The same procedure could provide a defined congressional purpose at one point while strengthening partisan objections if the inquiry is characterized as retaliatory. The reporting does not establish which effect would predominate. An investigation directed at subordinate officials may produce evidence about executive conduct while appearing to avoid direct judgment of the president, potentially weakening the connection between the inquiry and broader presidential accountability.

The strategy’s durability therefore depends on standards applied regardless of which party holds the presidency or controls the inquiry. Without such standards, resistance to congressional oversight could shift from presidential and legal grounds to partisan grounds. Finkelstein’s emphasis on patience also stands against her warning that democratic repair left no time to lose; the reporting does not state a preferred investigative tempo.

An implication of Finkelstein’s account is that the same congressional history could support a contrary conclusion if the inquiries became symbolic or detached from evidence-gathering. The source leaves that possibility unresolved. On this account, the strategy can relocate rather than eliminate the circularity Finkelstein identifies when partisan division determines whether extraordinary investigative authority appears legitimate. The central unresolved issue is whether Congress can exercise independent authority over testimony without making the authority of inquiry depend on the partisan balance of the moment.

Analytical techniques used in this piece

This analysis applies the methods below. Each links to a short, plain-English explainer you can read and reuse.

Dialectical Analysis
Holds thesis against antithesis and works toward a higher synthesis.
Worldview Cartography
Maps the clashing worldviews underlying a dispute.