The current global era — often described as one of “global rupture” following the “law of the jungle,” a phrase attributed to former Bank of England governor Mark Carney — is marked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, and U.S.-led attacks on Iran and Lebanon. These events, Tocci writes in a column published by the Guardian, appear to confirm the bleak outlook that the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. But, she argues, a closer inspection reveals a different story.
Russia, Tocci writes, “has trampled all over international law” and remains the stronger party in its war with Ukraine, both militarily and demographically. The Trump administration, she says, has “betrayed Ukraine,” while European support, though “strong and consistent,” remains insufficient. Despite this, Tocci writes, “Ukraine stands tall.”
Tocci’s analysis also focuses on the U.S.-led campaign against Iran and the subsequent diplomatic outcome. The U.S. and Israel struck Iran, she writes, in a “blatant violation of international law,” with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu convincing President Donald Trump — in Tocci’s account — that one final push would topple the Islamic Republic like a house of cards. Four months later, the U.S. and Iran agreed to a memorandum of understanding that reopened the Strait of Hormuz, de facto recognized Iranian control of the waterway, and temporarily waived oil sanctions. The deal, Tocci argues, “was the best deal Trump could secure, but it was not a good deal for the US or Israel.”
MSI previously reported that a memorandum of understanding signed between the U.S. and Iran had raised questions about what the war had achieved, with analysts describing the outcome as a strategic reversal of the Trump administration’s stated goals.
Tocci points to two European-led initiatives as more encouraging signs for the rule of law. A coalition of about 40 countries, led by France and the UK, has formed a taskforce to potentially deploy to the Strait of Hormuz to clear it of mines and secure the waterway for shipping. Tocci describes the initiative as “mainly aimed at managing the US,” a signal to Washington that European governments are ready to contribute to securing a peace they were unwilling to fight for. She notes that without Tehran’s consent, there will be no operation.
A second, more concrete initiative, Tocci writes, has taken shape “below the radar.” Norway, which she says has “strong political credentials in the Middle East” and has “clearly condemned the war from the outset,” has provided legal counsel to Iran and Oman, as well as Pakistani and Qatari mediators, to ensure that any post-strait arrangements comply with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos), which has been ratified by most states. Both the U.S. and Iran, while not parties to the convention, are “interested in respecting its terms in the strait,” Tocci writes.
Tocci also addresses European policy on Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank. Kaja Kallas, the European Union’s high representative for foreign affairs, has formally asked the European Commission to table a proposal on a ban on imports from illegal Israeli settlements, a move that would require only a qualified majority vote, not the unanimity needed for sanctions on individual ministers. Most member states already support the ban; Germany remains the only large country in opposition, with officials arguing that a ban would evoke “Nazi discrimination against Jews,” a comparison Tocci calls “obscene.”
The analysis concludes with a broader argument: that the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, despite their human costs and legal violations, offer a “brighter” clue for the future — one in which even the most powerful actors face limits, and the possibility remains for international law to reassert itself.