An expired U.S.-Russia pact leaves long-range arsenals without binding limits
China’s rapid nuclear buildup has created a two-adversary challenge for a U.S. deterrence strategy built around Russia. China has grown its arsenal from the low 200s to around 600 warheads since the start of the decade, and many U.S. officials believe the current strategy and force structure are insufficient for that shift. The Pentagon projects the country is on track for more than 1,000 warheads by 2030. President Trump plans to meet Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin on Thursday, where he plans to discuss nuclear arms control.
American policymakers built and refined nuclear deterrence to counter one primary adversary, Russia. For the first time since the dawn of the atomic age, the United States must prepare to face two major rival powers with substantial nuclear capabilities at once. Some arms-control experts call the dynamic a “three-body problem,” a reference to the physics puzzle in which three celestial bodies exert force on one another, making their movements deeply unpredictable. A new period of uncertainty and distrust now risks reigniting a nuclear arms race.
China’s arsenal remains much smaller than U.S. and Russian stockpiles, but Beijing has repeatedly refused negotiations that could limit its size, noting that China has far fewer weapons than the United States. A Federation of American Scientists chart cited in the reporting breaks that stockpile comparison into warheads on missiles and at some bases that are not deployed but in storage and those deployed plus reserve. China’s Foreign Ministry said the country “always keeps its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security and has no intention of engaging in a nuclear arms race with any country.”
Decades of arms-control negotiations and treaties between the United States and Russia — including Salt, Start and Sort and the 1987 Intermediate–Range Nuclear Forces Treaty — led to a steep drop in nuclear stockpiles from their Cold War peak, according to Federation of American Scientists data that marks the 1987 treaty on its stockpile timeline. Their most recent bilateral pact, New START, expired in February. It is the first time in half a century that their long-range nuclear arms have been unconstrained by a legally binding agreement. The pact’s communication channels and mutual monitoring systems also expired, clouding U.S. visibility into what Moscow is doing with its nuclear weapons.
Putin has offered a handshake deal with Trump to keep weapons caps in place for a year as talks proceed on future arms-control arrangements. The Trump administration has said any new agreement should include China. Paul Dean, vice president of the nuclear policy program at the Washington-based nonprofit Nuclear Threat Initiative, said, “We’re on the precipice of what is looking like an action-reaction-driven arms race because of this tripolar nuclear environment.” Dean said the tripolar environment is occurring “at the exact same time that the tools that we have previously negotiated to stabilize and reduce risk of miscalculation have fallen away.”
For much of the nuclear age, the two-country system was relatively simple to understand. Each side built nuclear forces capable of surviving a first strike and launching a retaliation, and the prospect of mutually assured destruction kept the “two-body” system stable. Now, many in the United States believe Washington must consider what kind of arsenal it would need to deter a second major adversary if it had already retaliated against the first, experts say. American defense planners have discussed expanding production of nuclear warheads and pulling inactive warheads out of storage to increase the number deployed on long-range delivery systems.
China long followed a strategy that experts called “minimum deterrence,” maintaining a small nuclear arsenal. The United States treated China as a “lesser included case” of the Russian threat, assuming an arsenal designed for Moscow also would deter Beijing. Under Xi, China appears to have moved away from minimum deterrence and now has the world’s fastest-growing stockpile of warheads. In just the past half-decade, China’s military built three new silo fields for storing and launching intercontinental ballistic missiles across hundreds of miles. China also is expanding sea- and air-launch systems and, earlier this year, fired a ballistic missile into the Pacific from an advanced new submarine, demonstrating its sea-based nuclear deterrent.
A new uranium-enrichment plant is nearing completion in Sichuan, near bamboo-carpeted mountains where giant pandas roam. Some U.S. researchers believe it is likely to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons, which would end China’s four-decade pause on such production. The more warheads China builds, the more fissile material it will need. According to a new analysis by Hui Zhang of Harvard University’s Belfer Center, China’s uranium-enrichment capacity has doubled in the past six years and is now greater than what it needs for civilian use.
Some of China’s newest centrifuges sit inside an industrial park on the outskirts of Emeishan City in Sichuan. China has not given the International Atomic Energy Agency access to the Emeishan facilities, and they are not mentioned in annual reports by China’s civilian nuclear regulator. Zhang said that level of secrecy suggests the facilities may serve military uses. He estimated the centrifuges could supply highly enriched uranium for thousands of nuclear warheads.
“There’s no plausible civilian explanation for the expansion in capacity at Emeishan,” Zhang said. He estimated China’s recent buildup of warheads had nearly exhausted its reserves of enriched uranium, “so if they want to get to 1,000 they need to enrich more.” Nuclear experts believe China stopped enriching uranium for weapons in 1987, though Beijing never said so publicly. China is the only permanent member of the United Nations Security Council not to declare a moratorium on production of fissile material for weapons.
Arms-control experts said U.S. efforts to expand missile defense are helping drive China’s nuclear buildup. Trump’s push for a “Golden Dome” shield would combine ground-based interceptors with satellites to guard U.S. territory against hypersonic missiles and other long-range threats. Beijing and Moscow have called the proposal destabilizing. As the United States talks about missile defense, China worries it does not have enough missiles for deterrence, according to Mark Goodman, a former senior scientist in the State Department’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation.
Goodman said, “Defense sounds inherently benign, but in fact, if you have a sword and you pick up a shield, you become more threatening to someone who doesn’t have a shield,” and “And they might decide they need a bigger sword to defeat your shield.”
In a 2023 report, a congressional commission on the U.S. strategic posture said the country should no longer treat China’s nuclear forces as a “lesser included” threat. It called for the United States to re-evaluate the size and composition of its nuclear force to account for possible combined aggression from Russia and China. The commission said the U.S. could no longer assume that forces needed to deter or counter Russia would also suffice against China simultaneously.
Dean said a U.S. decision to expand its nuclear forces would pressure Beijing and Moscow even if Washington explained the buildup as a response to the new “three-body” scenario rather than being aimed at either country individually. “Neither Russia nor China will take the U.S.’s word for that,” he said, adding, “And then they will have an incentive to build up.”
Arms-control experts say that, like the issues around deterrence, diplomacy has also become more complicated with three players in the mix. Russia, preoccupied with the war in Ukraine, has different priorities than China, said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association. “Russians are aware of the fact that many in the Trump administration are thinking about adding warheads to the existing U.S. force,” Kimball said. “They would rather avoid that if they can because their military’s stretched.” That puts both Moscow and Washington at odds with Beijing, which has little interest in agreeing to any deal that would constrain its weapons program.
Even establishing reliable communication on nuclear issues between Beijing and Washington would be a win for the United States, some analysts said. Goodman noted that “China has traditionally seen opacity as a strategic asset.”
The danger for the Trump administration is that China could use its interest in a nuclear deal to extract concessions from the United States in other areas, such as support for Taiwan. “China, in particular, sees our interests as giving it leverage,” Goodman said. “When we come across as so eager to talk, it can reinforce China’s approach of playing hard to get.” Ahead of Thursday’s summit, a senior U.S. official said Washington recognizes the difficulty China faces in discussing nuclear arms control but believes Beijing must nevertheless engage in serious talks.