Semiconductor controls tighten after the Nvidia scandal

The Nvidia scandal may have halted the drift toward what Greg Ip calls state capitalism, Ip wrote. Huang had persuaded allies inside the administration that selling chips to China would keep China addicted to American technology. Those allies have been overruled by officials whom Ip described as hawks, who tightened controls on semiconductor sales; Congress is considering going further. Democrats plan to investigate ties between business and the White House in January.

On Fox News, Robert Lighthizer, Trump’s first-term trade czar, said the illicit sale of Nvidia chips to China was tantamount to the Soviet theft of American atomic weapons secrets during the Cold War. He imagined a Ronald Reagan adviser using Huang’s “addiction” logic in the 1980s and suggesting that American space-based missile-defense tech be sold to the Soviets “because then they’ll get addicted to us. The whole notion is beyond preposterous.”

Nvidia’s donations accompanied Huang’s appeal

Greg Ip, The Wall Street Journal’s chief economics commentator, has written about the intersection of economics, markets and politics for more than 40 years. Nvidia donated $1 million to Trump’s inauguration and $25 million to his White House ballroom as Jensen Huang personally urged Trump to lift restrictions on some chip sales to China. Trump did so the previous year in exchange for a cut of those chips’ sales going to Treasury.

The arrangement fit what Ip described as Trump’s mercantilist view, which equates national greatness with money flowing in from exports, investment, tariffs, cash payments from or equity stakes in American companies. Ip wrote that some people call this crony capitalism, adding: “I call it state capitalism, the insertion of the state into private business decisions.” He described the practice as common in China and Russia and even Western Europe, but not, until now, in the United States.

Ip called Nvidia’s sale of chips to China controversial and wrote that, apart from Huang’s personal conduct, it was “the logical outcome” of the closer government and corporate relationship he described.

Huang joined Trump’s May China mission

In May, Air Force One stopped for refueling in Alaska en route to China, and Nvidia’s then-chief executive Huang came aboard. Huang was one of more than a dozen CEOs on the trip, including the heads of Citi, Goldman Sachs, Qualcomm, Micron and GE Aerospace. His presence attracted new scrutiny in light of revelations of an affair with a suspected Chinese spy.

Trump told his Chinese hosts, “We have the greatest businessmen, the best in the world.” He added, “They look forward to trade and doing business.”

Other countries’ leaders regularly traveled to China with executives selling everything from cars to chemicals. U.S. presidents occasionally led trade missions abroad but generally not to China, where political and diplomatic considerations long overshadowed commercial opportunity. Trump had led a similar trip during his first term, but Ip wrote that the May China mission broke with precedent and symbolized how government and corporate interests had become more tightly intertwined during his presidency.

Export controls have long collided with commercial interests

In Ip’s historical account, American efforts to weaponize exports have clashed with commercial interests basically since Thomas Jefferson embargoed Britain two centuries ago. After World War II, the United States and its allies sought to limit the sale of dual-use technology to the Soviet Union and China through the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, or CoCom. Exceptions and evasion were commonplace. In one case, a unit of Japan’s Toshiba and a Norwegian company exported machine tools that enabled the Soviet Union to build quieter submarines.

With the end of the Cold War, presidents faced growing pressure to lift restrictions, especially on China, and regularly did. After the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the policy pendulum swung back as the United States enrolled banks in a campaign to cut the flow of money to terrorists and to countries such as Iran and North Korea.

Ip wrote that the United States was always more willing than its allies to subordinate commercial gain to national security. Juan Zarate, who led the sanctions effort at Treasury under President George W. Bush, recalled that American banks regularly complained they were “forced to be absent from markets where our competitors do business.”

Germany pursued a different commercial path

Germany took the opposite tack, Ip wrote. Former Chancellor Angela Merkel regularly flew planeloads of executives to China, deepening German dependence on one geopolitical rival, while her approval of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline to Russia over U.S. objections deepened dependence on another.

Edward Fishman, who worked on sanctions in the Obama administration, said that around 2015 the United States learned that two gas turbines that Germany’s Siemens planned to sell to Russia were intended for Russian-annexed Crimea, in violation of sanctions. His German counterparts, he recalled, “toed the Siemens line,” denying any such connection. The turbines ended up in Crimea, and Germany eventually prosecuted former Siemens executives for a sanctions violation.

“It was an educational moment for me,” said Fishman, now at the Council on Foreign Relations. “The model of German capitalism is different.” Fishman said, “The current Trump administration looks a lot more like Germany in the Merkel era than the U.S. in the rest of the 20th and 21st centuries, keeping companies at arm’s length.”

Matthew Turpin, who served on the National Security Council during Trump’s first term, said Germany’s readiness to do business with American adversaries instead of America helped form Trump’s mindset. He described the United States as “being taken advantage of by allies. Why are we making these sacrifices? It’s their security.”

Presidential intervention reached beyond chip sales

Shortly after returning to office, Trump rolled back enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which bars American companies from bribing foreign officials to win business. Trump wrote that overzealous enforcement “actively harms American economic competitiveness and, therefore, national security.” He also approved sales of sensitive technology, including F-35 jet fighters to Saudi Arabia and Nvidia chips to the United Arab Emirates, despite fears from some U.S. officials that the technology would leak to China.

Trump also began intervening directly in company business, including taking direct stakes in companies such as Intel, critical-minerals producers and the missile business of L3Harris. Scott Lincicome of the Cato Institute said, “The government has always done things like subsidies and tariffs, but it hasn’t…had a financial stake in the success or failure of those companies.” He added, “This is different. It just creates terrible incentives.”

Many governmental agencies and processes established over the years to mediate between commercial and national interests have been sidelined, Ip wrote. Some large companies bypassed the Justice Department’s antitrust division and sought approval for mergers directly from the Oval Office. Multinational companies generally disliked Trump’s tariffs, but some, including Apple, obtained exemptions by appealing directly to him.

MSI previously reported on Trump’s closeness to Huang and the resulting intelligence and chip-policy scrutiny. The donations and Treasury arrangement reported here add detail to that earlier account of presidential access and export decisions.