Amber Titus wakes at 5 a.m. three times a week to make a 45-minute drive she cannot afford to miss. The nearest clinic is in Sierra Vista, about 30 miles from her home in Bisbee Junction, Arizona. It opens early and closes before midday; her shift starts at 9. Arriving 10 or 15 minutes late can cost her a dose. When their car was totaled in August, Medicaid arranged rides to the clinic. The driver was supposed to arrive at 6 a.m. The drivers arrived late every morning, and Titus missed her medication for an entire week.

That is not merely a transportation problem. It is the business model of American methadone care.

Methadone is one of the most effective medications for opioid addiction, roughly halving the risk of fatal overdose. Yet only 22% of people with opioid use disorder receive it, while federal estimates show more than 120 Americans died from opioid overdoses every day in 2025. This is not a shortage of effective medicine. It is a shortage of permission, a shortage of rural clinics, and a shortage of transportation that never seems to arrive. It is also a business opportunity—and private equity has bought into it.

The scarcity is manufactured by regulation. For more than five decades, methadone has been confined to government-approved opioid treatment programs. Ordinary doctors and pharmacies cannot prescribe or dispense it. Patients must often appear in person every day, submit to observation, and accept strict limits on take-home medication. Only 19% of patients receiving take-home methadone receive three or more days’ supply. That system gives local clinics something extraordinarily valuable: captive demand.

The government built the scarcity. Private equity bought the clinics controlling it.

Research finds that 35% of opioid treatment providers are affiliated with private equity firms. In 19 states and the District of Columbia, more than half have private-equity owners. As of October 2026, there were 1,572 methadone clinics registered with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. The treatment system has not kept pace.

The roll-up works in increments. Private equity buys one large clinic, then steadily acquires smaller nearby operations until one firm controls a region’s methadone supply. The strategy is the same one used to assemble regional gas-station chains: buy the largest operator, absorb the smaller competitors one by one, and turn a collection of businesses into a local monopoly. Each deal looks too small to matter. Collectively, they give one owner control of the tollbooths.

Research on acquisitions from 2011 through 2019 found that, within two years of a private-equity firm entering a county, it typically controlled 67% of the local methadone market. In more than a quarter of counties, one firm controlled the entire market.

And what did this capital build? Not treatment capacity.

Those acquisitions generally failed to produce new clinics, more treatment or higher methadone shipments. Opioid-related deaths were unchanged during the study period. In the plainest terms available: private equity did not build new capacity. It bought the capacity that already existed.

The consequences are most severe in communities that can least afford to lose a clinic. Montana has four methadone clinics, all owned by Community Medical Services, or CMS. The company was operating there before it was acquired by private equity. No expansion has taken place in Montana. Building a new clinic costs about $2.5 million—often more than a rural community can support. CMS owns three of North Dakota’s four methadone clinics. In Arizona, it owns the Sierra Vista clinic where Titus receives her methadone.

According to CMS CEO Nick Stavros, the chain grew from 14 clinics in four states before private-equity investment to 79 across 14 states—49 of them new sites. The total includes five prison clinics and three mobile units. Scale increased. Capacity in the places needing it most did not. In 2018, a prospective investor advised shutting CMS’s Montana and North Dakota clinics as unprofitable. Stavros opted to partner with a different private-equity firm to keep them open. That choice preserved existing capacity. It did not expand it. One operator’s selective growth does not overturn the category-wide finding that private capital consolidated existing clinics without materially expanding methadone access.

And more patients entering a building is not the same as more patients staying alive.

A separate study of buprenorphine, another medication for opioid use disorder, found that patient volume at private-equity-acquired facilities rose about 22%. The same study found that the share of patients who stayed continuously on buprenorphine for 180 days—the national quality benchmark—fell by nearly 8 percentage points. Methadone-specific comparison data was unavailable, but the lesson is plain: acquisitions can produce growth in visits while weakening continuity of care. Early discontinuation is one of the strongest predictors of relapse and overdose.

Private equity’s clearest achievement was billing, not treatment. One study found that clinics became significantly more likely to accept Medicare and Medicaid after private-equity acquisition—likely because large chains can afford administrative infrastructure small independent clinics cannot. Fine: the paperwork gets paid. But insurance acceptance is not the same thing as a clinic within reach, a dose available after a missed ride, or a patient who stays in treatment. An insurance card cannot help a patient whose ride never arrives or whose appointment window ends before work begins. Coverage is not access. Capacity is not continuity.

The existing arrangement does not merely wait for reform. It organizes opposition to it.

Congress has a chance to break the stranglehold. The Modernizing Opioid Treatment Access Act 2.0 would allow ordinary doctors to prescribe methadone and pharmacies to dispense it, ending the legal requirement that methadone be obtained only through an opioid treatment program. Its predecessor was introduced in 2023 and failed to reach a House or Senate vote before the end of the congressional term. The revised bill has attracted broad support from patient organizations and medical societies. It sits before the Energy and Commerce and Judiciary committees, which have not scheduled the next step—a markup—and the congressional term ends in January 2027.

The American Association for the Treatment of Opioid Dependence represents the incumbent clinic operators whose economics depend on keeping methadone inside the current clinic system. It argues that expanded prescribing and pharmacy dispensing would increase diversion and overdose risk. Mark Parrino, the group’s president, says it opposes the bill for two reasons: that it would let the Health and Human Services secretary determine which additional practitioners are qualified to prescribe methadone for opioid use disorder, and that it would allow methadone to be dispensed in dispersible tablet as well as liquid form. Parrino says tablets were “definitely” involved in the rise in methadone-related deaths that began around 1999. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and a Food and Drug Administration advisory tied those deaths to methadone prescribed for pain, not addiction treatment. The evidence so far does not support the diversion claim. That is why AATOD stands as the principal institutional opponent to competition from doctors and pharmacies: safety concerns deserve serious regulation, but a trade group’s defense of its members’ monopoly does not settle the question.

Firms controlling large shares of their local markets have a financial incentive to keep new competitors—including doctors and pharmacies—out. U.S. Sen. Maggie Hassan is investigating three of the country’s largest methadone clinic operators, citing concerns that they oppose expanding access for financial reasons rather than patient safety. Their names and the details of the inquiry do not matter. The incentive does: a new competitor threatens both revenue and regional control.

Transparency and enforcement could expose the market before congressional action catches up. Private equity is exempt from the disclosure requirements that apply to publicly traded companies. Indiana, California and Maine have enacted or proposed private equity and management-company ownership disclosures for companies billing Medicare or Medicaid, while Vermont passed similar legislation this year. Regulators should also see local acquisitions before they become local monopolies.

The Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission already treat ownership of 30% or more of a local market as a warning sign. Yet methadone chains typically control at least 67% of a local market within two years of their first clinic purchase in a county. Most acquisitions never trigger the federal reporting requirement because they arrive as a series of smaller, piecemeal deals rather than one large merger. The requirement applies only to transactions worth more than about $134 million. State proposals to lower healthcare acquisition thresholds to around $10 million would expose the strategy before the roll-up is complete. That is the arithmetic private equity exploits: structure the roll-up below the reporting threshold and still control the market. Regulators cannot scrutinize ownership they cannot see, and law enforcers cannot challenge a roll-up that never registers as one.

Access does not have to depend solely on incumbent clinics. CMS counts three mobile units among its 79 clinics, and mobile methadone vans in Connecticut show what extending opioid treatment access looks like when care is designed around patients rather than market share. Meanwhile, the CDC has told health programs to deprioritize harm reduction within days. Harm reduction is not a substitute for methadone. It is the safety net for people the treatment system has kept at arm’s length. Weakening that net while private equity entrenches methadone supply is not reform. It is abandonment.

Dr. Melody Glenn, an associate professor of addiction and emergency medicine at the University of Arizona, supports MOTAA 2.0, though she says the legislation should go further. “It’s time to remove the regulatory barriers to these lifesaving medications,” Glenn said. Too many people who could benefit never receive them. She put the stakes plainly: “They don’t have to die.”

Private equity has already won the methadone market. It must not win the law. Every month Congress delays reform is another month of five a.m. drives, missed doses and patients forced to choose between keeping a job and keeping treatment.

Amber Titus called methadone “a godsend.” Neither that word nor Glenn’s sentence needs to be hedged. The system already knows what works. What stands in the way is not medicine. It is ownership.

Pass the bill. Disclose the owners. Lower the reporting threshold. Stop treating the boundaries of a profitable market as the boundaries of medical care.

Methadone works. Now make it available to everyone who needs it.

They don’t have to die.