Catholic preschools demand public preschool money to exclude LGBTQ families.

The dispute is not about abstractions. Two Catholic preschools want access to Colorado’s publicly funded preschool program. Children and families are the people at the center. The religious-liberty claim is serious. Catholic schools have a constitutional right to teach according to their faith, and government cannot make religious conformity the price of operating a private school.

Access to Colorado’s particular program is voluntary. What the plaintiffs seek is entry into that program without the equal-access condition that defines it. If the state treats religious refusal as a choice, government controls the terms of the benefit and then calls religious surrender a choice. The preschools should not have to abandon the teaching at the center of their identity to receive public money. That is their strongest case, and it deserves a clean statement.

The Court granted review in April after the case worked its way up the state courts. At oral argument in St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy, No. 25-581 (U.S. 2026), Colorado described a program it runs for every eligible child, not a program designed around religious schools.

Colorado’s 2023 preschool program provides 15 hours a week of state-funded preschool. Colorado does not exclude religious preschools; it invites them to participate. Every participating provider—public or private, secular or religious—must give eligible children equal opportunity to enroll and receive services regardless of race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, gender identity, housing status, income, or disability.

The lower appeals court ruled for Colorado. Colorado had not categorically withheld funds from religious institutions. It had “welcomed and actively solicited their participation.” The schools are not outside the program. They are refusing its terms.

In their opening brief, the schools say Colorado excluded them because their religious beliefs made them unwilling to serve LGBTQ families. Nicholas Reaves, counsel at the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, put the position this way at argument: The schools ask families to be open to and supportive of Catholic teaching, and the state had denied Colorado families the ability to use universal preschool funding at Catholic schools.

The access cases are real. Two decisions define the boundary (Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 590 U.S. 464 (2020); Carson v. Makin, 596 U.S. 767 (2022)). Espinoza rejected Montana’s rule barring religious schools from a tax-credit program. Carson extended that rule to tuition assistance available to secular schools. Government cannot exclude religious schools from a generally available public benefit merely because they are religious.

But access is protected. The plaintiffs seek a subsidy with an exemption.

Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. 449 (2017), supplies the controlling distinction. The Court held that a state cannot bar a religious entity from a public-benefit program because of its religious status. It expressly left open whether the State could condition the grant on the church’s religious use of it. What Trinity Lutheran decided was the status point: no exclusion. What it reserved was the use-of-funds question.

Colorado’s enrollment condition is not a religious-use restriction. It is a nondiscrimination term governing enrollment. The state did not ask the preschools to stop teaching Catholic doctrine. It asked them not to exclude families from a publicly funded program. The first is religious exercise. The second is the condition of receiving public money.

Colorado’s rule is facially neutral, meaning written in terms that apply to everyone. It is generally applicable, meaning it governs every provider in the program. A conflict between compliance and the schools’ beliefs does not establish that the state targeted religious practice.

Fulton v. Paradise School District, 594 U.S. 102 (2021), and 303 Creative v. Elenis, 600 U.S. 570 (2023), mark the outer limits of the religious claim. Fulton held that the COVID-19 restrictions were generally applicable because they did not treat religious gatherings less favorably than comparable secular activities and imposed no extraordinary burden on religious exercise. It did not make every neutral rule subject to strict scrutiny—the Court’s most demanding constitutional test, reserved for government that targets religious exercise or treats comparable secular activity more favorably.

303 Creative held that Colorado could not compel a designer to create custom signs for same-sex weddings. Colorado could offer alternative designs or decline enforcement. That was a compelled-speech case: government forced a person to speak. A preschool program asks nobody to speak at a wedding. It asks every provider accepting public money to serve eligible children without selecting them by race, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity, income, housing status, or disability. The constitutional right to refuse to make a design cannot become a constitutional right to refuse public preschool funds while retaining the power to exclude.

The oral argument narrowed the issue. Justice Neil Gorsuch asked whether the justices had been “wasting our time for the last 10 years” in three religious-freedom cases. His question asks the Court to turn three decisions into the foundation for a broader rule. A prior decision matters because of what it held, not because it belongs to a recent list.

Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson asked how the Court should account for Catholic preschools already participating in the Colorado program. Some do. Colorado has not excluded Catholic providers as a class; the obstacle is the plaintiffs’ refusal to accept the equal-access condition.

Justice Elena Kagan asked whether Colorado had implemented its “neutral anti-discrimination principle” with the intention of discriminating against religious schools. The record described a rule applied across the program, not a campaign aimed at Catholicism.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor then stated the consequence exactly: The schools “are not being excluded on their face … they’re choosing not to participate because they won’t get an exemption. So this is their choice.”

Those exchanges expose the gap in the plaintiffs’ case. If a religious institution may invoke the First Amendment whenever a neutral public-program rule conflicts with its beliefs, government cannot administer any program involving private schools without first deciding whose religious exercise is sufficiently important. Public authority becomes guarantor of sectarian advantage.

The proposed rule would protect religious schools precisely when their doctrine generates the exclusion. That is precisely when the government’s interest in equal access is strongest. Free exercise protects the school’s worship and teaching. It does not purchase the right to use public money to select against the families the program exists to serve.

The US Conference of Catholic Bishops’ amicus brief warns that the lower court’s decision will embolden states and municipalities to enact ostensibly neutral laws that discriminate in fact. The warning reverses the constitutional problem. Neutrality is not the disease. It is the constraint on government and the protection of the program. An exemption would not repair religious discrimination. It would authorize a new legal preference based on religion. The plaintiffs cannot ask the Court to turn neutrality itself into a constitutional violation.

Colorado can defend its rule without hostility. The state may run a universal preschool program, invite private and religious providers, and require every participant to serve eligible children without discrimination. A provider that cannot accept those terms may remain outside the program and keep its doctrine. That is not categorical exclusion of religious schools; it is refusal to accept equal conditions for public funds. The First Amendment does not require Colorado to rewrite the program around an exemption.

Colorado did not ban the schools. The schools chose exclusion over state funding. The First Amendment does not make the state finance that choice.

Give the preschools an exemption and public money buys the right to reject LGBTQ families. That is not religious liberty. That is the public underwriting of exclusion.