Washington armed the war that destroyed Gaza and is already buying the next one. The proof arrived as paperwork, which is how this machine prefers its proof. The arithmetic is a State Department document sent to Congress, and reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, which counts about $10 billion in outstanding Israeli orders for American military hardware scheduled for delivery beyond 2028, tallied as of April 1, with no word on how the total has moved since.
President Trump said Tuesday that he plans to end military aid to Israel, and the announcement caught Israeli officials, including some in their security establishment, off guard, which tells you how much of it was declared before it was drafted. Both facts are true at once, and the second does not cancel the first. An announcement does not un-place an order. Trump is promising to end the aid that bought the bombs that fell on Gaza, and the promise landed the way these promises land: a declaration with no bill attached, no line item, no mechanism.
Understand how the money moves and the number stops being mysterious. The aid flows through Foreign Military Financing, FMF for short, which is American grant money with one condition loaded into it: it must be spent on American-made weapons. Bombs, vehicles, jet fighters. The standing pledge is a ten-year memorandum of understanding, a signed promise agreed to by the Obama administration, that runs through 2028 at $3.3 billion a year, making Israel one of the largest recipients of American military aid on earth. On top of that, Washington has already pledged nearly $7 billion more across the next two years, and in 2024, at the height of the Gaza war that followed the Hamas-led attack of October 7, 2023, Congress added about $26 billion. The structure lets Israel place orders against money that has not arrived yet, which the officials involved describe as flexibility in shipping weapons. Pledge now, order now, pay later. That is how a $10 billion obligation can stand behind a promise to end the money. The orders were placed while the promise was standing.
FMF is not charity that leaves the country. It is American public money routed through a foreign air force into American factories, and the Congressional Research Service counts about $174 billion of American military assistance and funding to Israel from 1948 through May 2025, unadjusted for inflation. That is a customer account, and it has a credit line. The same reporting notes that Israel’s immediate needs still run on the regular flow of American-made armaments, including the thousands of bombs the United States delivered across the recent wars, and the open orders include a squadron of twenty-five F-35s, Lockheed’s airplane. As recently as September, the administration had a $2.8 billion package of 2,000-pound bombs moving toward the same account.
Now, I’m just a simple man, but I have been writing parts orders at a counter in Georgia for most of my adult life, and I know what an open order is. It is a promise the business has already made to a supplier who has already started the work. You do not cancel it by announcing something. You cancel it by paying, or by eating the loss. Washington knows this. It is why current and former officials told the Journal an abrupt end to the aid is unlikely, and why Josh Paul, who resigned from the State Department over its support for the Gaza war and who supports shutting the aid off, put it the way he did: “It’s not plausible we stop by the end of this year,” because Congress has already committed the funding. His words on the announcement: “We’ve not seen anything yet to substantiate this.” The announcement is not the cancellation. Officials in both capitals have spent months discussing a phase-out, and Netanyahu has his own proposal to eliminate direct aid over the coming decade, a taper this publication has already charted, which tells you the machine does not move at the speed of announcements. Reporting this week also had the administration weighing an end to the annual aid in 2027 with outright sales of the weapons in its place, which changes who writes the check and not what gets shipped. Either way, the orders stand.
Nobody has answered the question the document actually raises, which is who pays. The State Department letter to Representative Joaquin Castro of Texas says the orders “could be covered either by FMF, national funds, or both,” which means the American taxpayer is still a named possible payer for hardware ordered under a program the President says he is ending. Read the letter plainly: either the United States keeps paying, or Israel pays, or both pay. Castro, who asked about the funds earlier this year, put the question the file leaves open: “Even if the MOU ran its full course to 2028, there’s still $10 billion above and beyond that, and there’s an issue of who’s going to pay for that.” Nowhere in that letter does anybody stop paying.
The President also told us what the announcement is for. He said ending direct aid would deprive critics of Israel of a political talking point, and he tied the remark to Abdul El-Sayed, who campaigned on ending unconditional aid and won election Tuesday as the first Muslim to represent Michigan in the United States Senate. So the promise is aimed at the argument.
The politics have moved in both parties, and the standard I apply does not move with them. The memorandum was Obama’s. The $26 billion supplement was Biden’s, passed at the height of the war the bombs went into. The announcement is Trump’s, and on the direction, he and Netanyahu now agree; the machine is the constant. Vice President JD Vance, posting after his party took major losses in Congress, named the Iran war and the American relationship with Israel among the top reasons voters went against Republicans, and in a second post cited polling on what would bring those voters back. Declining support for Israel in both parties follows years of war in Gaza and Lebanon and this year’s joint American-Israeli attack on Iran. None of it touches the order book. El-Sayed’s voters and Vance’s voters are looking at the same machine, and the machine’s answer to all of them is the letter Castro had to ask for. The State Department did not respond to a request for comment.
Andrew Bacevich named the pattern a generation of soldiers and scholars had stopped being surprised by. In Washington Rules he laid out the credo that survives every election: American primacy, permanently projected, permanently funded. That credo does not live in speeches; it lives in statutes, contracts, and appropriations, which is why the policy outlives every administration that gestures at questioning it. A press conference is a gesture. The memorandum, the pledges, and the order book are the policy.
Say what the money bought, slowly, because a funding table is exactly the form that makes it weightless. The bombs went into Gaza, one of the densest places human beings live. Those wars destroyed much of the enclave and killed more than 74,000 Palestinians by the count of Palestinian health authorities, who do not say how many of the dead were combatants. From where I sat in the gunner’s seat in Iraq in 2003, the chain was short and visible: American factories, American money, an authorization signed by men who would never hear a round fired, and a turret at the end of it.
Michael Walzer built Just and Unjust Wars, the modern statement of the just-war tradition, on the discipline of asking two questions separately, the justice of going to war and the justice of how it is fought, jus ad bellum and jus in bello in the old Latin, and inside the second question stand two requirements with plain names. Discrimination: aim the violence at military objectives, not at the people those objectives hide among. Proportionality: keep the destruction in scale with the end claimed. A government that supplies the weapons stands inside the second question whether it admits it or not. The supplier does not get to point at the shooter. A 2,000-pound bomb carries no discrimination setting. It carries a blast radius. The people who ordered it, paid for it, and shipped it own that arithmetic, and the document sitting in Congress this week is the invoice.
Eisenhower saw the arrangement coming and named it from higher ground than any critic since has occupied. In his farewell address of January 17, 1961, he warned against “the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex,” and against a “disastrous rise of misplaced power,” the potential for which “exists and will persist.” That middle phrase, whether sought or unsought, is the whole warning, and it is usually read too small. He was not only warning about lobbyists hunting contracts. He was warning about commitments that outlive the will to end them: orders signed, money pledged, statutes written, the machinery running while the announcements change. Sixty-five years later, the exhibit is this document. A draft of that address, worked up by speechwriter Malcolm Moos and on file at the Eisenhower library in Abilene, carries the longer phrase, the military-industrial-congressional complex, and carries, too, the decision to cut it. Congress was in the sentence. The word was cut in redrafting, and every line of this story runs through the cut word: the FMF appropriation, the $26 billion supplement, the statute obliging the United States to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military edge” over its rivals, and the bill now drafted to fold Israeli-American co-production into the National Defense Authorization Act, the annual bill that sets the Pentagon’s budget, by year’s end. The cut looks like the load-bearing edit, because Congress is exactly where this money lives. Congress is not an obstacle standing between the president and the end of the aid. Congress is the second half of the complex. Eisenhower knew it. The word was cut. The machine kept it.
The co-production bill is the machine updating itself. Lawmakers have drafted legislation to move the funding from foreign financing into defense investment and joint production, and they mean to write it into the defense bill, which is expected to be finished by the end of the year. Set the two clocks side by side: the law lands this year, the order book it never settles runs past 2028, and the entrenchment will be old before the last of the hardware arrives. Convert the aid into co-production, its proponents argue, and the Pentagon cooperates with Israel more easily, building on Iron Dome, the air-defense system that included the participation of American firms. Its critics answer that the conversion embeds Israel deeper into Pentagon supply chains and programs so that a future Congress would find the arrangement hard to repeal. The critics are describing the mechanism accurately. Writing cooperation into the defense bill is how a commitment outlives the argument over it. Underneath all of it sits a standing American law, the qualitative military edge commitment, which obliges Washington to keep the American equipment Israel can buy a step ahead of every potential rival, so that cutting the aid runs against the government’s own statute. The orders are the trap for both camps. The critics who want the aid cut and the supporters who want it converted into co-production are standing in front of the same invoice.
The constitutional posture is older than any of this and plainer. Article I gives Congress the purse, and with it the declaration of war. Money that stocks a foreign arsenal at $3.3 billion a year, decade after decade, on memoranda signed by one administration and inherited by the next, is the war power running on autopilot, and my column on Tuesday’s announcement made the structural point that this plan, like every plan for this money, runs through Congress. If the aid continues, let it continue by standing law that Congress debates in the open and can repeal in the open. If it ends, let it end the same way, by legislation, not by a Tuesday statement.
If the president means it, the work is named and it is dull. End the FMF line in the appropriations bill. Decide in statute who pays the $10 billion of open orders, the United States or Israel. Revisit the law that requires the qualitative military edge. Strike the co-production title before it reaches the defense bill. Israel spends about 7 percent of its own economy on defense, more than any member of NATO, so the question of who pays is real and the answer is waiting. That is what ending the aid consists of, in bills and roll-call votes. Anything short of that is the announcement, and the arithmetic does not care who is president.
Eisenhower closed the warning with the remedy: “Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals.” Fifteen years I kept a television on in my waiting area, and nobody on it ever read that paragraph aloud. The silence was the mechanism working.
Here is the ledger as the State Department’s own arithmetic writes it: $3.3 billion a year through 2028, nearly $7 billion committed across the next two, about $26 billion appropriated in the war’s worst year, $10 billion in orders standing past all of it, and $174 billion back through 1948. The announcement does not appear anywhere in those numbers. More than 74,000 are dead, and the count does not say how many were fighters.
Washington armed the war that destroyed Gaza. Trump promised an end to the aid. The aid ends when the orders are paid for. One of the orders is a squadron of twenty-five fighters, and nobody has yet said who signs for them.