The Bank of England is billing working households for a war’s fuel costs.
Here are the numbers. The key rate — the interest rate that flows through every mortgage, loan, and line of credit in the economy — is expected to reach 4 percent from 3.75 percent on Thursday, its first increase since August 2023. Inflation reached 3.5 percent in September, an eleven-month high above the Bank’s 2 percent target, and is forecast to climb further. The direction of travel reversed because of a war: rates had been falling from a fifteen-year high of 5.25 percent until the United States and Israel attacked Iran in late February; fuel costs spiked; and bottlenecks in the Strait of Hormuz — the world’s most consequential oil and gas chokepoint — squeezed global supplies of oil and gas.
Say what the instrument actually does. A rate hike cannot produce oil and cannot reopen a strait. When supply falls, prices rise; that part is arithmetic. There are two ways to bring prices back down: restore the supply, or destroy enough purchasing power that buyers match what the war left behind. A central bank has exactly one lever, and it is the second. In the bank’s own idiom, higher rates cool an economy, bearing down on spending and inflation together, restraining growth while they do — and restrained growth is a synonym for lost hours and lost jobs. Applied to a shock that arrives from the cost side, the mechanism has exact arithmetic. The fuel line in the price index is set by a war and a blocked strait, not by anyone’s spending in Britain. The only way the nine members of the Monetary Policy Committee — the bank’s rate-setting body — can pull the overall number toward 2 percent is to shrink the rest of the index: the food, the rents, the clothes, the demand behind every line of household consumption that is not fuel. The shock is external. The adjustment is domestic, and it is a decision about how much of everyone else’s consumption to cancel until a war’s price stops showing up in the average.
Stephanie Kelton, describing the Federal Reserve, has put the instrument’s landing zone in one blunt line: the Fed fights inflation with unemployment it does not need. Taken as a program, that line overshoots — inflation is a binding constraint, and an entrenched overshoot costs working households more than it saves; the post-Covid outturn settled that. Taken as a description of where the force lands, it is exact, and it survives translation to Threadneedle Street: swap in the Bank of England and her sentence is Thursday’s job description. A rate rise spends demand. The demand it spends first belongs to households whose spending is leveraged and to workers whose jobs are newest.
The incidence — who actually bears a cost, as distinct from who is formally charged it — is lopsided. Debtors pay more. Savers and creditors collect. Workers in the sectors the cooling reaches lose hours or jobs. No part of that chain reaches the governments that started the war, and none reaches the producers who repriced the fuel. The cost of the shock is real; a rate decision answers a different question: who absorbs it. In Britain the mechanics are specific. Most of the mortgage stock sits on fixed-rate deals, so the increase lands on tracker borrowers — whose rates move with Bank Rate — within weeks, and on fixed-rate households in waves as their deals mature, and passes through leveraged landlords into rents. Mortgage payers are not a line the quarterly projections carry.
The laundering arrives pre-written. Economists say the nine policymakers have little option but to raise — the sentence the markets have settled on, the sentence already drafted for the occasion. A political choice laundered through the language of policy expertise is the oldest operation on this subject, and “little option” is its standard costume: a decision with losers reads better as arithmetic than as a choice. It presents an instrument choice as weather, and none of this is weather. Count what the sentence deletes. The committee could hold. It could move by less and say why. Each option is a different allocation of the war’s cost; none of them survives the sentence as costless, and none of them is allowed to appear as a choice about who pays. “Little option” is not a finding. It is a payer, selected in advance and dressed as arithmetic. Ellie Henderson, an economist at Investec, supplies the frame: committee members’ “patience with the recent rise in inflation has worn thin,” and “the longer energy prices remain elevated, the greater the risk that a temporary price shock becomes more permanent.” The true half first: those second-round effects — the war’s fuel bill getting built into wages and prices across the whole economy — are real, and waiting too long costs more later. The committee has known the trajectory since September, when it held at 3.75 percent while publishing projections that put inflation at 4 percent. It is not being surprised. The honest sentence — the committee prefers this adjustment path, and here is who bears it — appears nowhere, because it would have to name the people.
The case for raising rates is real, and it deserves its strongest form before the indictment proceeds. The Federal Reserve’s own retrospective on the post-Covid inflation is a confession on this exact point: the 2021 diagnosis of a transient shock was wrong, the delay was expensive, and the catch-up — four consecutive three-quarter-point increases in 2022, the most aggressive sequence since the early 1980s — was the bill for the delay. A committee that has watched that outturn — what actually happened, as against what was forecast — is not wrong to move early. It is wrong about what its move is. What the raising-case sentence never acknowledges is that a different assignment of the cost exists. It is the monetary cousin of the “tough choices” speech: sacrifice imposed, always, on the people least able to defer it.
The lineage is fifty years old, and it presents the bill at the same table every time. When an oil embargo repriced the Western economy in the 1970s, the Federal Reserve answered with a recession — the campaign that broke inflation by breaking the economy that carried it, driving unemployment to nearly eleven percent by the end of 1982. J.W. Mason, reviewing the century, finds essentially one unambiguous case of inflation beaten by monetary policy alone: the Volcker shock of 1979 through 1982, which ran alongside a concerted attack on organized labor. Paul Volcker spent the rest of his life defending that campaign, and in his own memoir accepted the recession it required as the price of credibility — undertaken, as he tells it, with the best of intentions; he does not dispute the unemployment that bought it. Maybe it was necessary. The intention does not change the mechanics. The interest-rate lever cannot produce oil. It can only reduce the number of people who can afford what the embargo left behind. Unemployment was the instrument then. The mortgage rate is the instrument now. The embargo has never once received the invoice.
Nothing here is peculiarly British. The Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank have been raising rates against the same shock, and on two continents the entire adjustment has been routed to the one channel whose costs land on mortgagors and workers — no fiscal actor appears anywhere in the tightening cycle. Market pricing already carries further increases into 2027, with the path beyond 4 percent uncertain. The bill for this instrument is not hidden; it sits on the central banks’ own books. The Federal Reserve has been running losses on its own portfolio since late 2022 — paying out more in interest than its holdings earn — and the losses have been feeding Washington’s grievances ever since. The tightening costs something, and the people who run central banks can read it in their own accounts. What has not been conceded is where the cost is aimed.
The Bank’s transatlantic counterpart has already amended its own doctrine in the direction this episode cuts. In 2020 the Federal Reserve adopted a framework that treated employment shortfalls more tolerably than inflation overshoots, promising to let prices run hot to make up lost ground. At the first scheduled review after the pandemic shock, it formally reversed the design — replacing the make-up strategy with flexible inflation targeting and restoring symmetric language on employment. A framework turned inside out at its first scheduled review is a framework conceding it was built for an economy that no longer exists. The lesson the Fed paid for, and the lesson the Monetary Policy Committee is applying on Thursday, is the same: answer the shock before the shock teaches itself into wages. That case stands. Apply it. But an institution applying a lesson at full force owes the public the other half of the accounting — what the lesson costs, and on whom.
I will also grant the framework its blind spot. The models I spent a career with treated the price level as one number; the last decade’s literature is clearer that the same inflation rate is a different event for a household with a mortgage rolling over into a higher rate and a household without one.
One actor is missing from the story the markets have settled. The shock is a war; wars are fiscal events; the government of the country whose inflation is being fought holds instruments the committee does not. Temporary, targeted relief on the fuel component of the household bill would hold the part of inflation that is imported, and a levy on fuel producers capturing the shortage premium would recoup part of the war’s cost from the windfall that caused it — cushioned at the bottom, recouped from windfall, decided in public. The objection to relief writes itself, and it deserves its full strength before the proposal proceeds: relief on fuel is demand support — subsidizing consumption of a blocked supply, blunting the very price signal meant to ration it — the case pressed against Britain’s own blanket energy-price guarantee in the last energy crisis. But the objection answers the wrong counterfactual. The squeeze is paid either way, and composition is the only choice on offer. Holding the imported component changes the composition of the squeeze, not its size — the war’s bill stops being paid through domestic demand compression, and the committee still tightens against every compounding line a rate rise can reach. A price signal left alone to ration a blocked supply rations by income. That is not price discipline; it is a bill collector with a preference for the poor.
The necessity framing runs the other direction whenever a treasury wants cheap borrowing: the committee that must hike today is, in a downturn, the committee that must support the recovery by holding rates down. Both sentences are distributional choices presented as arithmetic. Whichever government wants which lever, the question is identical — who pays.
Two repairs would make Thursday honest. The Treasury should hold the fuel component of the household bill — temporary, targeted, for as long as the war sets the price — so the committee tightens against the compounding and nothing else. The committee cannot do the fiscal half; it can do the disclosure half. It should publish what it has never published: the incidence of its own instrument, by income and by housing tenure, beside the inflation and growth forecasts it releases. Forecasting inflation while declining to forecast who pays for the disinflation is half the technical work, with the unpriced half billed to whoever cannot price it back.
Thursday, nine policymakers vote on a number: 4. The vote will be recorded in the minutes; the incidence will not be, unless someone is required to publish it. The war that set the number was started by two governments in February, and the households billed for it did not choose it. The “little option” that justifies it was drafted before the committee convened. The war set the price. The committee is choosing the payer. There is no other way to read the record: this committee is not out of options. It is out of options it is willing to name.