Stephen Miller is seizing Congress’s power of the purse and calling it governing.

Here is what the record shows. The Wall Street Journal’s November 7 profile documents the machinery now assembled around the new chief of staff: Mr. Miller has personally drafted or edited nearly every executive order the president has signed. Some posts inside cabinet agencies now report to him directly, past their own secretaries. With Russ Vought, the White House budget chief, he is charting a second-term agenda built on what the profile calls “executive actions that do not require congressional approval.” His daily call convenes at 10 a.m. and sweeps agencies across the government for new ways to press the immigration crackdown; officials inside U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement told the paper the tone on those calls alarms them. The purview runs the trade war, the pressure campaign on universities, and the Pentagon’s strikes on alleged drug-carrying boats in the Caribbean. This publication had already documented the sweep of White House power the day before the appointment.

Associates describe the first test of the new chief of staff as whether he can satisfy the president’s desire to punish perceived political enemies. A punishment agenda needs levers, and in a republic the levers are mostly money and law.

Three numbers carry the indictment. Article I, Section 9, clause 7: where the purse lives — “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” Forty-five: the number of days the law permits an executive to withhold an appropriation while Congress considers a rescission — a formal request to cancel spending Congress already ordered. January 2020: the month the Government Accountability Office ruled, in decision B-331584, that Mr. Vought’s office violated the Impoundment Control Act — the 1974 statute governing a president’s withholding of money Congress has ordered spent — by holding Ukraine security assistance Congress had appropriated during the first Trump term. The GAO finding was a verdict on the outer edge of the purse machinery. The office that produced it now co-authors the governing agenda.

The clause is not a norm. The Antideficiency Act makes it a federal crime for any official to knowingly and willfully obligate money in excess of appropriation. I built federal baselines — the spending and revenue projections every other number is scored against — for thirty-five years at the Congressional Budget Office on a single premise: money appropriated is money spent as written unless Congress rescinds it by vote. That premise is not a budget convention. It is Article I, operating as a jurisdictional boundary: elected representatives decide what the government buys; everyone else executes. Bypassing it has a shorter name: legislation by memorandum.

The machinery for routing around the clause was built, then tested. Congress answered Richard Nixon’s refusal to spend money it had appropriated by writing the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which let impoundment — a president’s refusal to spend appropriated money — survive only as a rescission, which dies unless both chambers agree. It has been tested twice since. In January 2025 the Office of Management and Budget ordered a government-wide pause on grants and loans; courts halted the order within days and the office withdrew it. In July 2025 Congress surrendered roughly $9 billion to a rescission, the first presidential cancellation to survive since 1992. Mr. Vought has argued for years, on the record, that the statute constraining this power is unconstitutional. The theory, the precedent, and the apportionment valve — the budget office’s authority to release appropriated money to agencies by installment — now sit in the same two offices.

Three portfolios in the new chief of staff’s purview draw on the clause without passing through it. The trade war is import taxes levied under emergency authorities rather than through the committees that own revenue policy. The universities campaign holds federal research money as the lever, administered by memorandum. The Caribbean strikes kill people on boats without a declaration of war or a use-of-force authorization. Each portfolio spends the Treasury. None of the three passes through the branch the Constitution charges with deciding it.

The trade war deserves the detail, because a tariff is a tax. The Constitution gives Congress — not the president — the power to lay duties, imposts and excises. Congress lent that pen to the executive in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, which allows a president to restrict trade during a declared national emergency. A president who governs tariffs through emergency declarations is levying taxes without a vote of Congress, under a statute written for emergencies, and the chief of staff who now oversees the trade war’s rollout drafted or edited the orders that do the levying. The delegation is Congress’s own work. The decision to make delegation the organizing principle of government after an election repudiated the agenda is Mr. Miller’s.

Symmetry, because the record demands it. An earlier administration protected from deportation a population Congress had declined to legalize, by executive memorandum, after the statute failed — the same governing-around-Congress move pointed the other way, and the courts spent a decade disciplining it. Budget-process evasion is not coalition property. What is specific to this arrangement is its architecture: a chief of staff who edits every executive order, convenes a daily call to harvest enforcement ideas from agencies across the government, and now charts the response to the probes and subpoenas the incoming congressional majority has promised using instruments Congress cannot vote on. Same move, different scale. The scale is the indictment.

The capture extends past appropriations. Elite universities sit inside the portfolio, and Mr. Miller is pushing a hard line in the administration’s probes of the nation’s biggest banks over the accounts they closed for political and religious reasons — bank supervision, the state’s power over whom banks must serve, run at the White House’s insistence. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s own inquiry into the question found “no evidence of denial of services” on viewpoint grounds. A probe contradicted by the regulator’s own record is not oversight. It is a requisition — the government instructing the regulated on whom to serve, under threat of investigation, on a premise the record does not support. Both are uses of public authority to reward and punish political conduct, under a chief of staff whose stated early test is delivering precisely that. The supervisory machinery works identically for whoever holds it next; a successor administration inherits it intact. This agenda fails the only test that matters for any such power: whether its holders would accept it in their opponents’ hands.

The complaint against Susie Wiles, the chief of staff Mr. Miller replaces, was that the Justice Department was not jailing reporters or prosecuting opponents fast enough. Mr. Miller has made an unusual appearance at FBI headquarters to press the priority of investigating political violence from the left. When a check has arrived, it has come from money rather than law: a green-card policy was reversed quickly after technology executives objected. The clause has produced no comparable reversal.

The counterpower sits in the same clause the machinery bypasses. The incoming House majority holds the subpoena and the purse. Congress’s deeper failure is older than this administration. Continuing resolutions — stopgap funding that extends last year’s numbers — have replaced real appropriations for years at a stretch, and both parties lent the clause away one resolution at a time; every scoring desk in town, the one I sat at included, priced the maneuvers on request. The receipts are nonetheless asymmetric. The scale, the coordination, and the declared theory of the present arrangement have no precedent in the record.

The repair is procedural and unglamorous: full-year appropriations passed on time; every rescission brought to a recorded vote in both chambers rather than surrendered in advance; the blanket trade delegations sunset; any withholding conditioned on an up-or-down vote inside the statutory window; the GAO’s 2020 ruling written into law so that violating it carries consequence; the apportionment valve operated under statute rather than memorandum, with every withholding reported to Congress within days. Money appropriated is money spent, or money rescinded by Congress. Nothing in between — except the forty-five days Congress itself wrote into the statute — is a budget convention. Everything past that window is a seizure with paperwork. The power of the purse belongs to the institution that wrote the clause. That institution can retake it by the same authority that produced it.

Mr. Miller has told associates he plans to limit the influence of lobbyists on the administration. The profile names a different set of intermediaries being removed: cabinet secretaries, the Justice Department’s independent judgment, the legislature’s vote. His daily call met at 10 a.m. this week as usual. Nobody on it mentioned the election. There is no other way to read the record.