The Roberts Court is making the laws that protect workers unenforceable.
On Tuesday the Justices hear argument in Department of Labor v. Sun Valley Orchards, and the question printed on the page is narrow: how far SEC v. Jarkesy (2024) extends. The case arrives with the employer having won below — the Third Circuit held that although history permits non-Article III adjudication for certain immigration matters, this dispute sits “well outside the heartland of that tradition.” The narrow question serves a larger design, one this column has documented for years: remedy by remedy, forum by forum, the Court has been dismantling the places where laws protecting workers and consumers actually operate, while constructing new constitutional protections for the businesses those laws reach — protections that run against the agencies enforcing them. Sun Valley Orchards measures how much of that work remains.
In 2016 the Labor Department charged Sun Valley Orchards, a fourth-generation family farm in New Jersey, more than $550,000 for breaking the contracts it had signed with guest workers under the H-2A visa program — the program that brings foreign workers to American farms for seasonal work, on contract terms the department itself prescribes by regulation. The department said the farm failed to provide the kitchen access it had promised and sent workers home before their contractual end dates. Sun Valley contested the charges in the department’s own tribunal and lost twice. An administrative law judge — a government employee working for the agency that brought the charge — upheld the findings, and the department’s Administrative Review Board upheld them again. The executive wrote the terms, charged the breach, and tried the charge before its own adjudicators; the steep penalties in part drove the farm to shut down.
Begin with Jarkesy at its strongest, because it is strong. The government prosecuted an investment adviser for securities fraud inside a Securities and Exchange Commission tribunal — no jury, no judge of the constitutional courts. A securities-fraud enforcement action resembles the common-law fraud suit: a wrong, an injured party, money damages. “While monetary relief can be legal or equitable, money damages are the prototypical common law remedy,” Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for the majority. The Court added that even where the public rights doctrine — the carve-out allowing Congress to route certain government-adjacent disputes to agency adjudication — arguably applies, “the presumption is in favor of Article III courts.” An attorney aligned with that majority would defend the reasoning without embarrassment: no agency should act as prosecutor, judge, and jury over penalties that look like common-law liability. The concern is real. The Seventh Amendment — the constitutional guarantee of a jury in civil suits for money — does protect jury trial against an executive that prefers to adjudicate its own accusations.
The audit begins where the deployment begins. Track the same Court’s jury-and-forum jurisprudence by who stands accused. In Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497 (2018), Justice Gorsuch’s opinion enforced arbitration clauses that removed employees from court entirely for their wage and antitrust claims — no jury, no judge, no class. The jury the Chief Justice later pronounced constitutionally essential when an agency fines a securities-fraud defendant was, for those employees, forfeitable by a contract their employer drafted.
Three terms later the same operation ran against damages. Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021), stripped 6,332 class members of their statutory damages award because their injury lacked the concrete harm Article III standing requires — the doctrine requiring a plaintiff to show a particularized, real-world injury before suing in federal court. Congress had defined the injury and supplied the remedy. The opinion held the Constitution forecloses it.
And against federal officers, the remedy is gone altogether. The Bivens line — the doctrine that once allowed a person to sue a federal official for damages over a constitutional violation — ends at Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022): no damages remedy at all against a Border Patrol agent who tackled an American innkeeper on his own property.
Set the three lines beside Jarkesy and the direction is legible. Where the accused is an employer, the courthouse door closes — arbitration, standing, no remedy. Where the accused is an agency and the accuser a regulated business, the door swings wide, with a jury posted beside it. That is not jury protection. It is a one-way courthouse door, and Jarkesy is its newest panel.
The Court did not have to take the case. The employer had already prevailed in the Third Circuit, and the department petitioned anyway; the grant exists so the Justices can decide for themselves how far their own ruling runs. The machinery they are being asked to police belongs to no party. The Court itself upheld agency adjudication of penalties without a jury in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 430 U.S. 442 (1977), and every administration since — Republican and Democratic — has run such tribunals. The tribunal that fined Sun Valley Orchards is not a partisan artifact.
Nor is the law settled the other way. Whether a penalty for H-2A contract violations is a “public right” that Congress may commit to agencies is genuinely unsettled, and the Court has never clearly defined a private right or a public one. The government reads Jarkesy as confined to private wrongs and invokes the immigration carve-out; the Third Circuit itself conceded that “history does sanction non-Article III adjudication for certain immigration-related matters,” and its “heartland” conclusion is a judgment call inside a contested doctrine — reasonable jurists land on both sides of it. A presumption against a category with no border is a presumption either side can win by naming the category: the label decides the forum, and nobody has written the label down. Note, too, who argues which direction: the Justice Department of this administration defends the tribunal’s authority; the business respondent who won below presses the extension.
Now what the case is actually about. The H-2A program runs entirely on its written terms: the government conditions the labor supply on them, the employer signs them, the worker crosses a border on the strength of them. When the department enforces the terms through its tribunal, it is collecting on the government’s own bargain — the price of the workforce. Extending Jarkesy to this case gives no one a jury who was denied one. It removes the only forum where the terms carry a price.
The department’s fallback argument reaches further than its first: take the program, accept its conditions, and you accepted the tribunal. Sun Valley’s brief answers that the theory “would allow the executive to transfer whole areas of litigation out of the courts.” The answer does not depend on this farm. A farm that needs guest workers to bring in the harvest has no real choice about the program, so accepting its conditions is not a choice of forum. If a condition drafted by an agency can move a case out of Article III court, then any agency moves any case out of court by adding a line to its regulations. The forum becomes a function of paperwork. Substitute a trucking company, a home health agency, or a construction contractor for Sun Valley Orchards, and the analysis does not change. And the executive would gain by regulation what employers already hold by contract: the power to move a dispute out of court before it is heard.
The Court’s own logic, applied evenly, states the honest rule. If money-damages claims are “suits at common law” the Seventh Amendment reserves to juries, the same Amendment cannot tolerate form contracts that strip employees of that jury for identical claims. If “the presumption is in favor of Article III courts,” the presumption cannot be forfeitable by the employer who wrote the arbitration clause. A process jurisprudence that constitutionalizes procedure for corporate defendants and waives it for their workers is not process. It is allocation.
The statutes remain on the books after Tuesday either way. That is how the work gets done without repealing a word: kill the forum, keep the text. Epic Systems left the wage statutes standing. TransUnion left the credit statutes standing. Standing and uncollected.
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the two sentences this case turns on: money damages are the prototypical common-law remedy, and the presumption favors Article III courts even inside the public-rights doctrine. He wrote no sentence defining where the exception ends. In seven years of reading this Court’s opinions front to back, I have never found one. The past decade documents which litigants the presumption serves. Sun Valley Orchards shut down, ruined, and the exception is still open. The Roberts Court is making the laws that protect workers unenforceable, and Sun Valley Orchards measures how much of the work is left.