Trump is rewarding Putin’s invasion while Russian troops keep killing Ukrainians.
For a Ukrainian parent trying to get a child through another day of Russian fire, “diplomatic restoration” has a plain meaning. Trump is reducing the isolation that made the invasion more expensive, and Ukrainian families and communities are the ones paying the bill. When one government welcomes the man whose forces are killing another country’s people, it weakens the consequences those forces must bear. Access to the American president is itself a reward. The guns do not pause for the handshake.
I was an Abrams crewman in the early Iraq occupation. From where I sat in the gunner’s seat, I learned that the distance between a polished phrase and a military order is measured in a body. That is how I read this summit. A decision made in a conference room does not stay in the room. In Ukraine, it arrives as Russian fire falling on families and communities while Washington supplies legitimacy to the man ordering it. At home, any new military commitment arrives as absence from a working community. The people at both ends carry decisions made by men arranging photographs.
China confirmed the trilateral meeting for Thursday during APEC, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. On Wednesday, Xi Jinping met Donald Trump on the tarmac in Shenzhen with a military flyover and a welcome no Chinese president had given an American president before. Trump had given Xi the same kind of pageantry in Washington in September. Thursday’s first-ever trilateral meeting with Vladimir Putin places the three leaders together as stewards of the world’s three largest nuclear arsenals. The scene is meant to show a new order before the old one has been examined.
Trump wants the image of a global peacemaker as his second term enters its final two years after midterm defeats. Xi wants to convene the would-be G3 on Chinese soil. Putin wants Washington out of Ukraine. The United States is bogged down in a war in Iran, while Russia is bogged down in the war in Ukraine. The meeting gives all three men a stage from which to appear to be managing peace while their wars continue.
I will not call that a peace summit. A peace summit should change what the parties are permitted to do. This one mostly changes how they are seen.
For Ukrainian families, that distinction is not cosmetic. A change in permission to keep killing is measured in dead Ukrainians. A change in the photograph is measured in prestige. Trump wants the second while claiming the first.
Putin’s invasion made him an international pariah for nearly five years before this diplomatic comeback. Then Trump called him a friend, greeted him warmly, and put him at the table beside Xi. That is the reward. It is not a settlement in Ukraine. It is not a nuclear treaty. It is Putin restored to the center of great-power diplomacy, with Trump supplying the legitimacy and China supplying the stage.
Calling Putin a friend does not pencil out as foreign policy. It is the currency of a diplomatic comeback, while Ukrainian lives pay the bill.
The strongest fact in Trump’s favor is that Putin proposed the trilateral as a venue for discussing an end to the Ukraine war. The separate Trump-Putin meeting planned for the same day is to focus primarily on Ukraine, according to the Kremlin. That is the true half of the summit. Talking about ending an invasion is not ending it, and access to the man ordering the killing does not supply the constraint. Trump bears specific responsibility because he is the one choosing to restore Putin’s standing while Russian forces keep firing. That is the difference between mediation and indulgence.
Restoring standing lowers the cost of Putin’s use of force. It tells him that pariah status can be reversed. It tells governments watching that the penalties for conquest can be softened in the right room. The direct channel to the American president becomes bargaining material for the invasion, not a substitute for ending it.
Strip away the pageantry. Xi wants Washington to accept his claim that self-ruled Taiwan belongs to China. Trump wants China and Russian influence driven out of the Western Hemisphere so he can reassert American dominance there. Putin wants Washington out of Ukraine. They do not share a vision of a world order. They share a desire to operate without constraints in their own spheres, with no one else at the table.
That does not pencil out as peace. It pencils out as a bargain among three power managers to protect three spheres of control. For people outside those rooms, a “sphere” means leaders remain free to act while others absorb the consequences. Ukrainians are absorbing them now.
Xi is the reluctant party, but he does not come empty-handed. Beijing has resisted arms-control talks on the ground that its arsenal is smaller than those of Washington and Moscow. At Shenzhen, Xi is host and equal, meeting Trump for the third time this year. He gets equal standing without surrendering his claim on Taiwan or accepting a common set of nuclear limits. Putin’s presence lets Beijing present Russia as the junior partner and itself as the indispensable pivot of whatever order comes next.
Clausewitz wrote in Book I, Chapter 1 of On War that war is the continuation of political intercourse by other means. The conference table is not outside the wars and rivalries. It is another place where they are conducted.
Andrew Bacevich identified the governing pattern in Washington Rules: after the Second World War, successive administrations kept the same essentials, American military preeminence, leadership of alliances, overseas forces, and intervention. The Monroe Doctrine does not break that pattern; it renames it for the current administration. Trump can shake hands in Shenzhen while preserving Washington’s freedom to project force into Europe, East Asia, and the Western Hemisphere. He is not escaping those rules; he is trying to collect their credit.
Trump’s own account of the stakes is revealing: “As long as you and I are in charge of things, we’ll never have a problem.” That is not reassurance. It makes the management of nuclear arsenals depend on two men’s personal confidence and the assumption that nobody else gets a vote.
Arms control is not three leaders deciding they like one another. It is a legal and technical architecture with numerical limits, methods for inspecting compliance, consequences for violations, and institutions that survive the men who made them. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START, the last treaty limiting Washington and Moscow’s strategic nuclear arsenals, expired earlier this year. Trump acknowledges that reducing the arsenals by 2,000 weapons would be difficult, while U.S. officials played down any prospect of a breakthrough. As the leaders gathered, no new legal architecture had been announced, and there was little sign of progress on the wars in Ukraine or Iran or on nuclear proliferation.
A serious three-power arrangement would need published force ceilings, which are legal numerical limits on weapons, inspection rights allowing outside inspectors into the facilities, and clear consequences for violation. The bargain must be reciprocal and checkable. Moscow accepts ceilings and inspectors at its silos, Washington accepts ceilings on its own forces, and Beijing accepts counting and inspection for the arsenal it calls too small to matter.
Without those elements, any declaration is promise theater. If China is exempt from limits, the result is a U.S.-Russia bargain with a Chinese blessing, not trilateral arms control. China’s smaller arsenal does not excuse China from the bargain. It makes China’s acceptance of limits a necessary part of any arrangement meant to constrain all three. For a Ukrainian parent, the difference between a treaty and promise theater is not semantics. It is whether the force still killing that family faces an enforceable consequence.
From the gunner’s seat, the test was whether an order could move. A summit can change the photograph; it cannot change the road to the objective, the fuel burned to reach it, or the cost of keeping the order moving. An arms-control declaration without inspection authority fails the same test. It cannot stop the guns.
The deeper mistake is treating access as leverage. Trump can host Putin, flatter Xi, and make a photograph showing that the powerful men are managing the world. None of that controls a single warhead. It gives Putin a way to turn aggression into bargaining material, gives Xi a summit to normalize his claim to equal standing, and gives Trump the legacy he wants. Enforceable diplomacy begins when each side gives up something that can be checked and enforced. This one begins with each side trying to keep everything.
The constitutional answer has to be plain. Congress should require every new nuclear-control arrangement to be reduced to a treaty, ratified by the Senate, with verification rules, inspection authority, and violation procedures written in advance. No new or expanded American military commitment in Ukraine should proceed without explicit congressional authorization defining its ends, duration, and limits. A president may negotiate a settlement, but he cannot turn a personal assurance made in Shenzhen into legal authority for a permanent war. And no Ukraine settlement should be accepted as peace unless its terms stop the invasion and bind Russia without leaving Moscow free to resume the killing.
Trump can take credit for the summit. Putin gets the friendship of the American president and an end to the isolation the West spent years imposing, and the dead stay dead.
Putin’s war does not pause for Trump’s group photograph. The killing continues.