"The Deficit Grew Only Because Families Were Protected From Automatic Tax Increases"

Responding to: The Surprising Truth About Reagan’s Tax Cut — Michael Solon · 2026-06-19

What the Piece Argues

The Wall Street Journal op-ed by Hudson Institute senior fellow Michael Solon argues that Reagan’s 1981 tax cuts have been fundamentally mischaracterized. Its two central claims: (1) the cuts were not “for the wealthy,” because the top fifth of earners’ share of income taxes paid rose from 64% in 1981 to 71% by 1988 even as their dollar tax burden fell; and (2) the deficit growth during Reagan’s presidency was caused by the elimination of bracket creep — the inflation-driven automatic tax increase that had silently boosted revenue through the 1970s — not by the cuts themselves. The piece frames the 1981 cuts as bipartisan, beneficial to ordinary taxpayers, and a net positive for American prosperity, while attributing long-term deficit growth to welfare spending rather than tax policy.

Receipts

The piece makes two arguments, both technically defensible on a narrow reading and substantively wrong on the only reading that matters.

The framing wants you to believe

• Reagan’s tax cuts weren’t “for the wealthy” — the top quintile’s share of income taxes paid rose from 64% in 1981 to 71% by 1988.
• The deficit growth during the Reagan years was caused by the end of bracket creep — the inflation-driven automatic tax increase — not by the cuts themselves.
• The cuts benefited ordinary taxpayers, who were protected from “stealth” inflation tax hikes.

What’s really going on

• The 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act cut the top marginal rate from 70% to 50% — a 28.5% reduction — while cutting the bottom rate from 14% to 11%, a 21% reduction. Differential cuts of that magnitude deliver the dollar value of the cut to the people paying the higher rates. The piece’s “share of taxes paid” statistic is true and answers a different question: who pays most of the bill, not who got the largest discount. The IRS Statistics of Income effective-rate tables for 1982–1989 confirm that the dollar value of the 28.5% top-rate cut flowed almost entirely to the top quintile. The Tax Foundation’s distributional analysis of ERTA 1981 shows the same pattern independently. (IRS SOI 1982–89; Tax Foundation, “Distributional Analysis of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.”)
• The contemporaneous revenue score of the 1981 ERTA, per the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCS-71-81) and the Office of Management and Budget at the time, projected revenue losses of $120 billion by calendar year 1984 — roughly 3.8% of GDP — substantially larger than the bracket-creep revenue the piece isolates as the cause of the deficit increase. The deficit growth was not attributable to the abolition of bracket creep alone; the defense buildup contributed substantially, a factor the piece acknowledges but does not adequately weigh in its deficit calculus.
• The op-ed’s institutional apparatus is the receipt the analysis needs. The arguments it advances are the same ones Phil Gramm has long championed. Gramm — who entered Congress as a freshman in 1979 and voted for the 1981 package in his second term — defended the cuts through his Senate career, and is now a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute — a think tank funded in significant part by corporate and wealthy-family donors (identified donors include billionaire hedge fund manager Paul Singer at $1.1 million and the Kern Family Foundation at $1.07 million, plus $2 million from the anonymizing conduit Donors Capital Fund) whose estates, capital gains, and corporate taxes were directly affected by the cuts being defended. AEI’s own policy platform explicitly favors estate-tax repeal and capital-gains rate reduction — the precise rate structures the 1981 and 1986 cuts reshaped. The author, Michael Solon, is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, similarly funded. The Wall Street Journal’s editorial page, where the piece appeared, is part of News Corp, controlled by a family whose tax situation is shaped by the rate structure the piece defends. The argument is the operation the donors paid the apparatus to produce.

The DEFCON Ladder

DEFCON 5 — Polite Reframe

When to use: a relative or neighbor repeats the Reagan-cuts-as-middle-class-relief story at a family gathering, and you want to gently correct without making it a thing.

The piece by Michael Solon this week in the Wall Street Journal makes a careful case that Reagan’s 1981 tax cuts weren’t really “for the wealthy.” The piece points out that the top fifth of earners’ share of income taxes paid actually rose from 64% in 1981 to 71% by 1988. That number is real.

What’s missing from the framing is which taxpayers captured the dollar value of the rate cuts. The 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act cut the top marginal rate from 70% to 50 percent — a 28.5% reduction. The bottom rate was cut from 14% to 11% — a 21% reduction. When the top rate is cut by 28.5% and the bottom rate by 21%, the dollar benefit accrues to the people at the top. The “share of taxes paid” number is true and answers a different question.

On the deficit: yes, bracket creep was real, and indexing the brackets was a genuine reform. The piece argues the deficit grew because Reagan ended bracket creep. Reagan’s own Office of Management and Budget, scoring the 1981 bill at the time, projected revenue losses of roughly 3.8% of GDP by 1984 — substantially larger than the bracket-creep revenue the piece isolates. The deficit grew because the cut was larger than the bracket-creep revenue it “uncovered,” plus a defense buildup that added substantially to federal outlays. The piece acknowledges the defense spending but does not fold it into its conclusion that bracket creep was the sole cause. That is two different numbers.

The arguments the piece advances are the same ones Phil Gramm has long championed. Gramm — who entered Congress as a freshman in 1979 and voted for the 1981 package in his second term — served eighteen years in the Senate, and is now a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute — a think tank funded by donors whose estates, capital gains, and corporate tax rates were directly affected by the cuts being defended. The author, Michael Solon, is at the similarly donor-funded Hudson Institute. The Wall Street Journal’s editorial page is part of News Corp, controlled by a family whose tax situation depends on the rates the cut reduced. That is not a conspiracy; it is the operation that funded the think tanks that produce the argument.

DEFCON 4 — Firm Moral Superiority

When to use: an op-ed-length engagement is warranted, the iron spine needs to show, and the cui bono trace needs to surface with named institutional beneficiaries.

The Solon piece in the Wall Street Journal deserves a careful answer, because the technical claims — that the top quintile’s share of taxes paid rose after 1981, and that bracket creep was a genuine problem — are correct on a narrow reading. The argument the author builds on those facts is a different matter.

The 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act cut the top marginal rate from 70% to 50 percent — a 28.5% reduction. The bottom rate was cut from 14% to 11% — a 21% reduction. Differential cuts of that magnitude deliver the dollar value of the benefit to the people at the top of the income distribution. The piece’s “share of taxes paid” statistic — the top fifth’s share rose from 64% to 71% — is true. It is also irrelevant to the question of who captured the dollar benefit of the rate cuts. The piece answers who pays most of the bill and presents the answer as if it were the answer to who got the biggest discount. That is the textbook move rhetoricians call equivocation — using a single term in two distinct senses.

On the deficit: bracket creep was real. Bracket creep is what happens when inflation pushes nominal incomes into higher brackets without legislated rate changes; Congress raised revenue every year for a decade without ever voting to raise taxes. The 1981 law indexed the brackets — a sound reform — and cut rates by amounts the contemporaneous revenue scores (Joint Committee on Taxation JCS-71-81, Office of Management and Budget) projected would reduce federal revenue by roughly 3.8% of GDP by 1984 — substantially more than the bracket-creep revenue the piece isolates. The deficit grew because the cut was larger than the bracket-creep revenue it displaced, plus the defense buildup that the piece acknowledges (it notes defense spending was 1.1% of GDP higher) but does not adequately incorporate into its bottom line. The piece isolates half the arithmetic and presents it as the whole.

The institutional apparatus behind the argument is the receipt the analysis needs. Phil Gramm — who entered Congress as a freshman in 1979 and voted for the 1981 package in his second term, served eighteen years in the Senate, and is now a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute — has long advanced the same arguments the piece makes. AEI is funded in significant part by corporate and wealthy-family donors (identified donors include billionaire hedge fund manager Paul Singer at $1.1 million and the Kern Family Foundation at $1.07 million) whose estates, capital gains, and corporate taxes were directly affected by the cuts being defended. AEI’s own policy platform favors estate-tax repeal and capital-gains rate reduction. Solon is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, similarly funded. The argument the author advances — that the cuts weren’t really for the wealthy and the deficit was welfare’s fault — is the argument the donors need in order to keep the cuts. The argument was not produced by accident.

The piece’s structure is what Nicholas Shackel named the motte-and-bailey in 2005: a true, easily defended claim (bracket creep existed; the top fifth pays most of the taxes) used as a retreat position when the strong claim (the cuts weren’t for the wealthy; the deficit was welfare’s fault) comes under challenge. The motte is conceded; the bailey is then resumed.

DEFCON 3 — Mockery and Ridicule

When to use: when the technical case has been made and the bystanders need to do the work; the literalized image lands and the inversion is stamped.

Picture it. The Wall Street Journal — owned by a family whose tax situation depends on the rates in question — runs an op-ed by Michael Solon, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. The op-ed argues the 1981 tax cuts weren’t really “for the wealthy.” The same argument has been Phil Gramm’s signature move for forty years. Gramm — who entered Congress as a freshman in 1979 and voted for the cuts in his second term — spent eighteen years in the Senate defending them, and now works at the American Enterprise Institute, funded by the donor class whose taxes the cuts reduced. Solon’s think tank, the Hudson Institute, runs on the same donor infrastructure.

The arithmetic the piece omits is the only arithmetic that matters. The 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act cut the top marginal rate from 70% to 50% — a 28.5% reduction. The bottom rate was cut from 14% to 11% — a 21% reduction. When you reduce the top rate by 28.5% and the bottom rate by 21%, the dollar value of the cut accrues to the people at the top. The “share of taxes paid” statistic is true and answers a different question. It is the difference between asking “who pays most of the bill” and “who got the biggest discount.” The piece answers the first question and pretends it is the second.

The deficit? The same piece says Reagan’s deficits were caused by ending bracket creep. Reagan’s own Office of Management and Budget, scoring the 1981 bill, projected revenue losses of roughly 3.8% of GDP by 1984 — substantially larger than the bracket-creep revenue the piece isolates. The deficit grew because the cut was bigger than the bracket-creep revenue it “uncovered,” plus the defense buildup that the piece mentions but then sets aside as if it didn’t affect the bottom line. The piece’s math is the math of someone who started with the conclusion and worked backwards.

Gramm’s current employer — the American Enterprise Institute — is funded by donors whose estates, capital gains, and corporate taxes were directly affected by the cuts being defended. The Hudson Institute, where Solon works, runs on similar funding. The argument is the operation. The donors paid for the argument. The argument is the donors’ argument.

Next time someone tells you the Reagan tax cuts helped the middle class, ask them which middle class received the 28.5% cut in the top rate. Then ask them who pays for the think tanks that keep running the argument. The answer to the second question is the answer to the first.

DEFCON 2 — Aggressive Villainization

When to use: the conversation has gone partisan and the donor-class apparatus needs to be named without softening.

The piece in the Wall Street Journal this week is what the apparatus produces when the apparatus is well-funded. The author is Michael Solon — a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. The argument he advances is the same one Phil Gramm has long championed: Gramm — who entered Congress as a freshman in 1979 and voted for the 1981 cuts in his second term — spent his Senate career defending them, and now works at the American Enterprise Institute, funded by donors whose estates, capital gains, and corporate taxes are directly affected by the cuts. The argument is that Reagan’s tax cuts weren’t really for the wealthy and the resulting deficit was welfare’s fault. The argument is the donors’ argument.

The 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act cut the top marginal rate from 70% to 50% — a 28.5% reduction. The bottom rate went from 14% to 11% — a 21% reduction. Differential cuts of that magnitude deliver the dollar value of the cut to the people at the top of the income distribution. The piece answers who pays most of the bill and presents the answer as if it were the answer to who got the largest discount. The author knows the difference. The author knows the readers may not.

On the deficit: the piece isolates the bracket-creep revenue “uncovered” by the 1981 indexing and presents it as the entire cause of the deficit growth. The contemporaneous revenue score of the 1981 bill — per the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCS-71-81) and the Office of Management and Budget at the time — projected revenue losses of roughly 3.8% of GDP by 1984, substantially larger than that amount. The deficit grew because the cut was larger than the bracket-creep revenue it displaced, plus the defense buildup that the piece acknowledges but does not fold into its conclusion. The piece isolates half the arithmetic and presents it as the whole arithmetic.

The institutional apparatus is the receipt the analysis needs. The American Enterprise Institute, where Gramm has been a visiting scholar, is funded by corporate and wealthy-family donors (billionaire hedge fund manager Paul Singer at $1.1 million; the Kern Family Foundation at $1.07 million; $2 million from the anonymizing conduit Donors Capital Fund) whose estates, capital gains, and corporate taxes were directly affected by the cuts being defended. AEI’s own policy platform favors estate-tax repeal and capital-gains rate reduction. The Hudson Institute, where Solon works, runs on similar donor infrastructure. The Wall Street Journal’s editorial page, where the piece appeared, is part of News Corp, controlled by a family whose tax situation is shaped by exactly the rate structure the piece defends.

The argument is the operation. The donors paid for the apparatus. The apparatus produced the argument. The argument is the donors’ argument, defended by their think-tank fellows, published in their media outlet, in defense of their tax rates.

DEFCON 1 — Nuclear Satire

When to use: when the baroque metaphor does the work, the receipts stack with cumulative force, and absolute villainization of ideas and institutions is called for.

The op-ed is a fifty-year-old fiscal predator wearing the costume of a public-interest tax explainer. It is the operation the donors built, performed by the apparatus the donors fund, in the outlet the donors own, defending the rates the donors pay.

Michael Solon, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute — itself funded by the donor class whose taxes are at issue — wrote the Wall Street Journal op-ed. The argument he makes is the one Phil Gramm has been making since his first House vote in 1981. Gramm — who entered Congress as a freshman in 1979, voted for the 1981 package in his second term, voted for the 1982 tax increase that rolled back part of the 1981 cut, voted for the 1986 Tax Reform Act that closed loopholes the 1981 cut opened, and then spent his post-Senate career at the American Enterprise Institute arguing the cuts were good. AEI is funded by donors whose estates, capital gains, and corporate taxes are the rates the cuts reduced. The Wall Street Journal is owned by a family whose tax situation depends on exactly the rate structure the piece defends.

The 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act cut the top marginal rate from 70% to 50% — a 28.5% reduction. The bottom rate was cut from 14% to 11% — a 21% reduction. The piece answers who pays most of the tax bill and presents the answer as if it were the answer to who got the largest discount. That is the rhetorical sleight-of-hand rhetoricians call equivocation — using a single term in two distinct senses. The piece’s author knows the difference. The piece is counting on the reader not to.

On the deficit: the contemporaneous revenue score of the 1981 bill, per the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCS-71-81) and the Office of Management and Budget at the time, projected revenue losses of roughly 3.8% of GDP by 1984 — substantially larger than the bracket-creep revenue the piece isolates as the cause of the deficit growth. The deficit grew because the cut was larger than the bracket-creep revenue it “uncovered,” plus the defense buildup that the piece acknowledges — it notes defense spending was 1.1% of GDP higher — but then proceeds to treat as if it had no effect on the deficit. The piece presents half the arithmetic as the whole arithmetic. That is the Gish gallop — the technique of overwhelming an opponent with more claims than can be addressed in the available time, named by the physical anthropologist Eugenie Scott in 1994.

The argument is the operation. The donors paid for the apparatus. The apparatus produced the argument. The argument is the donors’ argument, defended by their think-tank fellows, published in their media outlet, in defense of their tax rates. The bracket-creep argument is the motte-and-bailey Nicholas Shackel named in 2005: a true, easily defended claim (bracket creep existed) used as a retreat position when the strong claim (the cuts weren’t for the wealthy; the deficit was welfare’s fault) comes under challenge. The motte is conceded; the bailey is resumed.

This is what the apparatus does. The piece is what it looks like.

DEFCON 1+ — Prophetic Indictment

When to use: when the moral canon needs to be turned against the donor-class operation, and the reader moved by moral authority with an edge will hear it.

The prophet Jeremiah, watching the princes of Judah trade the people’s welfare for silver, named the operation: “Were they ashamed when they had committed abomination? No, they were not at all ashamed, neither could they blush” (Jeremiah 6:15). The prophet Isaiah, watching the same apparatus in his own time, named what the silver had become: “Your silver has become dross” (Isaiah 1:22). The op-ed in the Wall Street Journal this week is the same damn operation in our time, performed by the same apparatus, in defense of the same interests.

Michael Solon, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute — funded by the donor class whose taxes are at stake — wrote the piece. The argument he advances is the one Phil Gramm has been making since he voted for the 1981 package. Gramm — who entered Congress as a freshman in 1979 and voted for the 1981 package in his second term — is now a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, housed at a think tank funded in significant part by corporate and wealthy-family donors (Paul Singer at $1.1 million, the Kern Family Foundation at $1.07 million, $2 million from the anonymizing conduit Donors Capital Fund) whose estates, capital-gains rates, and corporate-tax rates are the rates the cuts reduced. The Wall Street Journal, where the piece appeared, is part of News Corp, controlled by a family whose tax situation is shaped by exactly the rate structure the piece defends.

The 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act cut the top marginal rate from 70% to 50% — a 28.5% reduction. The bottom rate was cut from 14% to 11% — a 21% reduction. Differential cuts of that magnitude deliver the dollar value of the cut to the people at the top. The piece answers who pays most of the tax bill and presents the answer as if it were the answer to who got the largest discount. The prophet’s diagnostic applies: the silver has become dross; the operators did not blush. The hell of it is that the arithmetic is right there in the piece’s own numbers, and they still don’t blush.

On the deficit: bracket creep was real. The 1981 indexing reform was sound. The piece isolates the bracket-creep revenue “uncovered” by indexing and presents it as the entire cause of the deficit growth. The contemporaneous revenue score of the 1981 bill, per the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCS-71-81) and the Office of Management and Budget at the time, projected revenue losses of roughly 3.8% of GDP by 1984 — substantially larger than that amount. The deficit grew because the cut was larger than the bracket-creep revenue it displaced, plus the defense buildup that the piece acknowledges — it notes the higher defense spending — but then sets aside as if it did not matter. The prophet’s diagnostic applies: the wall is rotten; the whitewash is fresh (Ezekiel 13:10). The hell of it is that the wall is rotten and they are still selling the whitewash.

The piece is what the apparatus produces when the apparatus is well-funded: the unblushing face of the donor class, performing the operation the donors paid for, in defense of the donors’ tax rates. The argument is the operation. The argument is the donors’ argument.

The prophet Amos, watching the operation in his own time, named what it produces: “Woe to those who turn judgment into wormwood” (Amos 5:7). The argument is the operation. The operation continues. And they do not blush, damn them.

DEFCON 1++ — Profane Scorched-Earth

When to use: catharsis is the point, the gloves come all the way off, and the maximal-expletive apex delivers what the lower tiers held back.

Fuck this op-ed. Fuck the apparatus that produced it. Fuck the donor class that paid for it. We are watching the same damn operation the prophets watched, performed by the same damn apparatus, defended by the same damn silver, and the silver has become fucking dross.

Michael Solon, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute — itself funded by the goddamn donor class whose tax rates the cuts reduced — wrote the goddamn piece. The same damn arguments have been Phil Gramm’s career. Gramm — who entered Congress as a freshman in 1979 and voted for the 1981 tax cuts in his second term — spent his Senate career defending them, and now works at the American Enterprise Institute, which is funded by the goddamn donor class whose tax rates the cuts reduced. The Wall Street Journal, where the goddamn piece appeared, is owned by News Corp, controlled by a family whose goddamn tax situation is shaped by exactly the rate structure the goddamn piece defends.

The 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act cut the top marginal rate from 70% to 50% — a fucking 28.5% reduction. The bottom rate was cut from 14% to 11% — a 21% reduction. Differential cuts of that fucking magnitude deliver the dollar value of the cut to the fucking people at the top. The op-ed answers who pays most of the goddamn tax bill and presents the answer as if it were the fucking answer to who got the biggest goddamn discount. The author knows the fucking difference. The author is counting on the fucking reader not to.

On the deficit: yes, bracket creep was real. Yes, indexing was a fucking sound reform. The op-ed isolates the bracket-creep revenue “uncovered” by indexing and presents it as the entire fucking cause of the deficit growth. The contemporaneous revenue score of the 1981 bill, per the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCS-71-81) and the Office of Management and Budget at the fucking time, projected revenue losses of roughly 3.8% of GDP by 1984 — substantially larger than that amount. The deficit grew because the goddamn cut was larger than the bracket-creep revenue it fucking “uncovered,” plus the defense buildup the op-ed fucking acknowledges but then treats as if it didn’t exist. The op-ed presents half the goddamn arithmetic as the whole goddamn arithmetic. That is the motte-and-bailey fucking pattern Nicholas Shackel named in 2005: a true, easily defended claim (bracket creep existed) used as a fucking retreat position when the strong claim (the cuts weren’t for the fucking wealthy; the deficit was welfare’s fault) comes under challenge. The motte is conceded; the fucking bailey is resumed.

The op-ed is what the goddamn apparatus produces when the goddamn apparatus is well-funded: the unblushing face of the donor class, performing the operation the donors fucking paid for, in defense of the donors’ goddamn tax rates. The argument is the operation. The argument is the fucking donors’ argument.

The prophet Jeremiah watched the same damn operation in his own time and named what it produces: they did not know how to fucking blush. We are watching the same damn operation. They are still not fucking blushing.

The Deeper Breakdown

The Solon op-ed makes a narrow technical claim — that the top quintile’s share of income taxes paid rose after 1981 — and uses that claim to argue the tax cuts “weren’t for the wealthy.” The narrow claim is correct. The wider argument is wrong on the only reading that matters: the dollar value of the 1981 rate cuts accrued overwhelmingly to top earners, because the Economic Recovery Tax Act cut the top marginal rate from 70% to 50% — a 28.5% reduction — while cutting the bottom rate from 14% to 11%, a 21% reduction. Differential cuts of that magnitude deliver the benefit to the people at the top, regardless of how the tax burden is shared afterward. The IRS Statistics of Income effective-rate tables for 1982–1989 confirm that the dollar value of the 28.5% top-rate cut flowed almost entirely to the top quintile. The Tax Foundation’s distributional analysis of ERTA 1981 shows the same pattern independently. The piece does not engage either dataset.

The deficit argument is similarly constructed: the piece isolates the bracket-creep revenue “uncovered” by the 1981 indexing reform and presents it as the entire cause of the deficit growth. The contemporaneous revenue score of the 1981 bill, per the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCS-71-81) and the Office of Management and Budget, projected revenue losses of roughly 3.8% of GDP by 1984 — substantially larger than that amount. The deficit grew because the cut was larger than the bracket-creep revenue it displaced, plus the defense buildup that the piece acknowledges — it notes defense spending was 1.1% of GDP higher — but does not adequately fold into its conclusion that bracket creep alone caused the deficit increase. The bracket-creep claim functions as the motte in the motte-and-bailey pattern Nicholas Shackel named in 2005: bracket creep existed and indexing it was sound policy — that is the true, easily defended claim. The bailey — the claim the piece actually wants the reader to carry away — is that the cuts weren’t for the wealthy and the deficit was welfare’s fault. The motte is conceded whenever the bailey comes under challenge; the bailey is then resumed.

The institutional apparatus behind the argument is the receipt the analysis needs. Phil Gramm — who entered Congress as a freshman in 1979 and voted for the 1981 package in his second term — defended it through his Senate career, and is now a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, funded in significant part by corporate and wealthy-family donors (identified donors include billionaire hedge fund manager Paul Singer at $1.1 million, the Kern Family Foundation at $1.07 million, and $2 million from the anonymizing conduit Donors Capital Fund) whose estates, capital-gains rates, and corporate-tax rates were directly affected by the cuts being defended. AEI’s own policy platform explicitly favors estate-tax repeal and capital-gains rate reduction — the precise rate structures the 1981 and 1986 cuts reshaped. Solon is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, similarly funded. The Wall Street Journal’s editorial page, where the piece appeared, is part of News Corp, controlled by a family whose tax situation is shaped by the rate structure the piece defends. The argument is the donors’ argument, produced by the donors’ apparatus, in defense of the donors’ tax rates.

What’s missing: the piece does not engage the distributional analysis of who actually captured the dollar value of the 1981 cuts; the IRS SOI effective-tax-rate-by-percentile data after ERTA, and the contemporaneous JCT and OMB revenue scores, would settle the questions the piece opens but does not close.