Spending cuts could ease pressure, but parliamentary divisions constrain action

France’s 10-year government bond yield reached a 24-year high on Thursday as investors identified the country’s debt burden and narrow room for fiscal adjustment as vulnerable to rising borrowing costs, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis by James Mackintosh. The yield briefly passed 5% the previous week, its first time above that level since 2002, while the premium over Germany’s 10-year bonds reached about 1.5 percentage points, the highest since the 2012 eurozone crisis. Mackintosh cited an International Monetary Fund forecast that France’s net debt would pass 111% of gross domestic product this year; the budget deficit is running at about 5%.

Market pressure and the ECB context

Mackintosh characterized France as the biggest victim of soaring global yields, saying its troubles resembled those of most other countries but were more severe. He traced the pressure to a strong U.S. economy that drove inflation and interest rates higher, prompting investors to look for the weakest links among companies and countries that would not be able to cope with higher borrowing costs. Mackintosh wrote that investors had landed on France, whose indebted government had been able to manage its finances only because interest rates were superlow.

A big drop in U.S. Treasury yields the previous week did not help France after the damage had been done. A raw reading from the FRED DGS10 series put the U.S. 10-year Treasury yield at 4.96% as of Oct. 25, 2026. Bond selling then began feeding on itself as hedge funds and other investors attracted by France’s higher-yielding carry strategy were pushed out of the market. Mackintosh said something had to give, but the resulting yields still had not risen enough to persuade the French public that the government needed to take the debt seriously.

Mackintosh said France remained a long way from a crisis, with a 5% yield far below the levels that would have emerging-market finance ministries seeking IMF assistance. The French yield was not at panic levels compared with Germany either. The extra yield on French 10-year bonds over German ones, or “Le spread,” was about 1.5 percentage points. Mackintosh called that spread worrying because it was the highest since the eurozone crisis of 2012.

In 2012, Mackintosh wrote, France was seen as one of the grown-ups, joining with Germany to force Greece into a painful default and other weak eurozone nations into austerity. Italy was the country refusing to adjust, and its 10-year spread over Germany hit 5.5 percentage points before the prime minister backed down and quit. Europe was more organized now, Mackintosh said, and the European Central Bank would probably step in to buy French debt long before financial markets reached panic levels.

Fiscal arithmetic and spending remedies

Mackintosh identified three connected problems. France already operated close to the financial limit at which new taxes would hurt revenue rather than help, and it appeared to be at the political limit where voters would not back either higher taxes or spending cuts. He said the combination made the IMF-forecast net debt position unsustainable.

Mackintosh’s arithmetic began with a budget deficit of about 5% of GDP and nominal growth — real economic growth plus inflation — forecast at no more than 3%. Because taxes broadly rise with the size of the economy, the government would need to raise new debt equal to 2% of GDP each year.

France was already carrying a large debt burden, and rising interest costs made the fiscal deficit worse every year as cheap debt from the zero-interest-rate era matured and was replaced by new debt at much higher cost. The French 10-year yield briefly passed 5% for the first time since 2002, when the country had much less debt and better growth prospects.

If France paid 5% on all its debt, Mackintosh estimated that it would add debt equal to 4% to 5% of GDP annually and face a self-reinforcing cycle of rising yields and interest costs. He said investors were weighing why they should assume the risk that France would fail to rein in its finances, particularly because a 5% yield remained comparatively modest by global standards.

The analysis described the financial solution as relatively straightforward: France needed to cut spending. Tax and other government revenue already equaled 52% of GDP, higher than in every developed country except oil-rich Norway and tiny Finland. Mackintosh said France did not have to balance its budget immediately, but a credible plan to move in that direction over roughly a decade could ease pressure. Government spending would still be higher than Germany’s, where it amounted to just over half the economy, and cheaper debt would itself help reduce the deficit.

Political feasibility determines the response

The political limit was the real challenge, Mackintosh said, pointing to the experience of investors in emerging markets. Countries almost always default not because they cannot pay their debts, but because politicians are unwilling to inflict the pain of lower spending or higher taxes to meet their promises to investors.

Mackintosh compared France with emerging markets on the basis of its unsustainable debt, extreme politics and riots. France had also borrowed in a currency its government did not control. Paris could not print euros to avoid problems; if conditions became much worse, Mackintosh said, France would have to seek help from the European Central Bank rather than simply order the Banque de France to purchase its debt.

Mackintosh said the situation could still work out if the next president both wanted to cut spending and had enough support in parliament. On current polling, he said, that president would probably be Marine Le Pen of the far-right National Rally, with major question marks over her willingness to cut spending and, if she won, her power. Le Pen had previously backed lowering the pension age to 60 from an already very low 62, which Mackintosh said would make France’s expensive state pension even costlier. Her party also helped force President Emmanuel Macron to reverse his signature reform, raising the pension age to 64 the previous year. France’s next president would not automatically control parliament, which Mackintosh described as divided among three antagonistic blocs.

Mackintosh said roughly half of the electorate believed the government could finance itself through additional debt or by taxing the other half of the electorate. Historically, the left sought higher taxes to finance more spending while the right favored lower spending and tax cuts. After the constraints of the gold standard fell away in the early 1970s and borrowing costs fell from the early 1980s, both sides could pursue their preferences, with debt filling the gap.

Four decades later, Mackintosh said, debt in many developed countries was getting too high to buy off voters while political debate mostly ignored the constraint. France was not alone in needing to take its finances seriously, he said.

About the analyst

The Wall Street Journal’s profile said Mackintosh joined the outlet in 2016 after almost 20 years at the Financial Times, where he most recently served as investment editor and wrote the Short View column. He earned a first-class degree in philosophy and psychology from St Catherine’s College, Oxford, and spent two further years there in postgraduate study of philosophy before entering the working world. The profile also said he has two children and a cat.