Trump has said the talks will cover denuclearisation, Iran, trade and Ukraine

Donald Trump, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are due to meet in Shenzhen on Thursday, and Rafael Behr, a Guardian columnist, describes the gathering as giving Russia the trappings of parity with the world’s two genuine superpowers while European democracies remain outside the room. Behr calls the summit a win for Russia regardless of whether anything of substance is agreed.

The agenda Behr describes is vague. The Chinese foreign ministry has said the discussion will focus on “safeguarding world peace” and “promoting strategic stability in major-power relations”. Behr writes that Xi would be satisfied with the projection of China as convener of a new world order. Trump has said he expects the conversation to cover denuclearisation, Iran, trade and “my favourite subject, Ukraine”. The leaders are due to meet on the sidelines of a summit for countries with Pacific coasts; Trump hosted Xi at the White House in September 2026.

Behr begins with Barack Obama’s 2014 description of Russia as a “regional power”, saying that few statements in 21st-century diplomacy had caused as much offence with as few words. He argues that Vladimir Putin’s politics were defined then, as now, by vengeful resentment of Russia’s relegation from superpower status after the cold war. Behr writes that Putin’s worldview is warped by a paranoid conviction that Nato never stopped striving to deepen that humiliation even after the USSR had unravelled, and that the Russian president expects to be treated as a colossus of world history. He adds that it is hard to overstate how bitterly Putin hated being dismissed by Obama as a geopolitical B-lister.

Behr writes that in Donald Trump, Putin has a “ready supplier of balm to soothe his injured vanity”. In Behr’s account, the US president has a “shallow, venal concept of power”: Trump is impressed by gilded palaces and heavily armed thugs, feels thwarted by American democracy and envies tyrants who operate without equivalent restraint. Behr writes that Trump measures greatness in a country by his leader’s contempt for smaller nations and appetite for self-enriching plunder, and willingly promotes Russia back to the top tier.

In Behr’s account, the image of three leaders calibrating the balance of global power has been compared to Yalta, February 1945: Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill drawing up plans for postwar Europe. He describes that as a week-long conference where military allies were settling the fate of a defeated enemy, and reads the analogy as revealing “mostly as an expression of anxiety in those who will not be present”. Behr writes that, for many Europeans, Yalta conjures memories of cynical partition, with eastern nations condemned to decades of Soviet captivity. He says the fear in Kyiv is that Putin will use his privileged access to Trump’s ear to press a twisted narrative about the origins of the Ukraine war and how to end it — Nato provocation, irresistible Russian superiority and the need for Europe to stop wasting money and US military hardware on a losing cause.

The exclusion of European democracies from the Shenzhen room is partly a function of the conversation taking place on the sidelines of a summit for countries with Pacific coasts, Behr writes. He describes a deeper strategic insecurity: Ukraine’s continental allies have asserted their rights to be part of any peace process but have not found a way to turn that entitlement into a collective position coordinated by a figure with diplomatic gravitas.

Disputes over Europe’s role were visible at a round of peace talks in Abu Dhabi last week. Behr describes Jared Kushner, one of Trump’s envoys, as making the reassuring statement that a deal could not be done “without Europeans being at the table”. Russia’s chief negotiator, Vladimir Medinsky, accused Europeans of lacking serious intent to find solutions and dismissed their delegation to the Gulf as “tourists” who might as well “chat in the hotel bar”.

Behr calls Medinsky’s intervention “standard Kremlin trolling”, but writes that it cuts with a shard of truth. He says the intervention points to an old problem, often described through the apocryphal tale of Henry Kissinger complaining that there was no number to call when he wanted to speak to Europe. Behr writes that the challenge is more acute today and that the institutional and economic foundations of European influence are under assault. In his assessment, Trump is ambivalent at best about Nato, his administration is protectionist and nationalist, and Maga ideology casts liberal democratic Europe as a “moribund civilisation erasing itself with mass immigration”.

Behr writes that China treats Europe as a bundle of consumers for manufactured exports whose politicians usually, by default, defer to Washington. He says the EU has ambitions of “strategic autonomy”, but the process is slow and expensive. Behr describes it as an evolution from soft power — rivalling the US and China in economic heft as a single market whose regulations set global standards — to something a lot harder. He writes that European electorates may despise Trump and fear Putin, but they are not all comfortable with the choices that follow if the remedy is a shift in budget priorities to higher defence spending.

Behr says a lot of European politics in recent years has been driven with a “longing eye on the rear view mirror”, wondering whether there was a way back to the old world of open trade, respect for international law and a White House that would not “abet the Kremlin in an imperial land grab”. He adds that there is growing recognition that Europe’s future cannot resemble its recent past.

Britain is part of that story, and Behr says Andy Burnham has understood the implications. In a speech on Monday, the prime minister expanded his criticism of Brexit from the economic to the geopolitical arena, calling it “the first domino to fall” in a pattern of global fragmentation. Burnham said the schism it introduced in European alliances was “exactly what our enemies wanted”. His audit of the costs in forfeited trade was familiar enough, Behr writes, but Burnham moved the argument up a gear by noting that withdrawal from the top table of European decision-making had cost Britain power and influence in the world — something continuity Brexiters cannot compute.

As Burnham finds his pro-European voice, Behr writes that “the old Eurosceptic myth-making industrial complex is grinding back into motion”. He says newspapers have published tenuous stories about the cost of restored alignment with Brussels and hypothetical migrant influxes, and that veterans of the leave campaign are limbering up for a “dismal dance” around the 2016 totem pole. Behr describes the resurgence as “rotten from exposure to a decade of international storms”.

Behr calls Britain “a regional power” that undervalued the amplifying effect of EU membership. He says the benefits of membership felt enough like great-power status to fool Eurosceptics into thinking they could go it alone, and that they cling to “that delusion”. Behr notes that Kemi Badenoch has written about Britain having “latent great power attributes”, but says she has no theory of how those dormant traits would be awoken in a world carved into continental blocs.

Burnham’s plan is hardly precise, Behr writes, but it starts with facts: Britain is a European country; Europe will be safer and richer if it pools its resources; and the UK should not want to be on the margin. Behr’s broader prescription is that Britain has to make common cause with its neighbours.

Behr writes that a summit where Xi, Putin and Trump claim to be deciding the fate of the world may not yield much in the way of concrete deals, but it still contains a warning to European democracies in a world he describes as carved into continental blocs by authoritarians. He frames the choice as one between boosting leverage through closer continental cooperation and flight into fantasies of immaculate national sovereignty and resurrected historical grandeur. Behr writes that one of those routes is a way for Europe to grow autonomy, security and prosperity in the 21st century, while the other is the path of bitter self-defeat modelled by Brexit.