Voters in four of EU’s five biggest states go to polls

Spain opens the sequence with a snap general election on 29 November. Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s socialist coalition faces probable defeat to rightwing parties — the conservative People’s party (PP) and the far-right Vox, which already govern together in some Spanish regions.

France follows in the spring with presidential and parliamentary elections. Marine Le Pen of the far-right National Rally is the clear frontrunner in the presidential race, well ahead of the far-left Jean-Luc Mélenchon and a hopelessly divided mainstream opposition.

Poland votes later next year. Nationalist parties that between them command nearly half the national vote could unseat the liberal coalition of Prime Minister Donald Tusk, despite recent splits among them.

In Italy, Giorgia Meloni, whose Brothers of Italy party has far-right roots, hopes to secure a second term in elections due before the end of 2027. She faces pressure on her right flank from the upstart National Future party.

Parliamentary elections are also due in Estonia, Finland, Greece and Slovakia, and regional ballots are scheduled in Germany.

The electoral sequence runs against an unusual backdrop: strong public support for the EU itself. Shocked by the chaos of Brexit and seeking reassurance in an increasingly alarming world, a record 74% of Europeans say their country benefits from membership, and very few Eurosceptic parties now advocate leaving outright.

The Eurosceptics and nationalists do, however, still view the bloc as a top-down project that undermines national sovereignty, and aim to transform it into an altogether looser association of sovereign nation-states. Natalie Tocci, an Italian political scientist, said the coming supercycle could “dramatically change the face of Europe,” triggering “a slow erosion of the European project but a hollowing out, if not an outright implosion.”

Analysts agree the underlying forces are connected: sluggish growth, ageing populations, strained public finances and a spiralling cost of living have chipped away at support for Europe’s traditional catch-all centre-left and centre-right parties. A wave of youth-led protests across the continent is, in this account, only the most visible sign of deep voter discontent.

Nationalist parties, meanwhile, have become increasingly adept at conjuring and exploiting an evolving list of supposed threats and crises — migration, vaccines, the green transition, support for Ukraine, globalisation, international elites and supranational institutions. Those narratives are bolstered by Russian disinformation and by overt backing for “patriotic” parties from Donald Trump’s White House. Nearly one in four voters now backs far-right parties, a share that has grown almost fivefold since the mid-1990s.

The rise has not been linear. Over the past year or so, the far-right Alternative für Deutschland scored a historic regional election victory in eastern Germany, but in the Netherlands Geert Wilders’s Freedom party lost nearly a third of its seats, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz was soundly beaten in Hungary, and the far-right Sweden Democrats shed support for the first time in 16 years. Political scientists attribute the underlying upward trend above all to media normalisation and the mainstreaming of far-right ideas, most notably on immigration. Centre-right parties are gradually dismantling the “firewalls” that once barred cooperation with the radical right, and at European level the centre-right European People’s party has increasingly turned to farther-right groups to roll back parts of the European green deal and tighten migration rules.

For the EU, the biggest impact could land in the European Council of national leaders, which now features just three centre-left heads of government out of 27. If Eurosceptic leaders in France, Spain and Poland join those of Czechia, Italy, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia by the end of 2027, they would not have the numbers to rewrite EU law — but they would constitute a formidable blocking minority. EU budget negotiations, future enlargement, aid to Ukraine and deeper integration in essential fields such as defence, energy, finance and technology could all face paralysis, analysts warn.

Tocci said safety in numbers could change current leaders’ behaviour. Meloni’s relative restraint has been dictated in part by her relative isolation among mainstream peers such as Tusk, Sánchez and France’s Emmanuel Macron, alongside Rome’s reliance on €200bn in EU recovery funds. Were she instead sitting down with the likes of Le Pen, Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) leader Jarosław Kaczyński and a Vox-backed Spanish government — with National Future’s hardline Roberto Vannacci breathing down her neck at home and those EU funds winding down — she might have less incentive to play pro-EU ball.

Analysts agree the decisive battleground is France. Le Pen’s election platform sets her on a collision course with Brussels: she aims to cut €11bn from France’s EU budget contribution, hold a constitutional referendum to proclaim the supremacy of French over European law, and breach various single-market rules. France “carries very significant influence over the EU,” said Mujtaba Rahman of the Eurasia Group consultancy. Compared with Orbán, he said, a president Le Pen would have “far more leverage to carry out the far-right playbook of subverting the EU’s law-based, supranational architecture.”

Brussels has contained disruptors such as Orbán largely because there were rarely more than two or three of them around the table. A cohesive Eurosceptic bloc would leave the EU unable to enforce rule-of-law standards, further integrate economic and security policies or, in the assessment offered, agree on anything much at all. The first victim would very probably be Ukraine, with Le Pen leading a blocking caucus against further aid.

Stefan Lehne of the Carnegie Europe thinktank said Europe’s coming elections could well turn into “key tests of the EU’s resilience.” The threat to the bloc might not be immediate or existential, he said, but the medium-term risks were significant. “A stronger role for the radical right may be unlikely to dismantle the EU as it exists today,” Lehne said, but it could “prevent it from becoming what it needs to be to deal with the challenges of the future.” Gradually but inexorably, in his account, prolonged failure to act collectively where needed would lead to a “loss of relevance.”

The comparison with the recent past is stark. In late 1998, Tony Blair was prime minister of Britain, Lionel Jospin was prime minister of France, and Gerhard Schröder had just been elected chancellor of Germany. The EU had 15 member states, and pro-European, centre-left parties were in power — alone or in coalitions — in all but two of them, with brisk economic growth lifting living standards and eastward enlargement under way. Not quite three decades later, the continent’s politics again appear to be tilting in a single direction, except this time the momentum belongs to the nationalist far right.